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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 The recent and ongoing developments in the Middle East1, deemed the “Arab Spring,” 
have highlighted the fact that the region is mostly ruled by autocratic governments, which has 
largely been the case ever since the end of World War II.2  Certainly, other countries in the world 
such as North Korea are autocratic, but according to Posusney (2005), the “density” with which 
authoritarianism exists in the Middle East sets it apart from the rest of the world.3  With the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the general consensus 
among many observers4 was that the Middle East would embrace democracy as what had been 
occurring throughout the world during the “Third Wave” of democratization.5  However, the 
Middle East did not follow this trend and this led to the beginning of what would become a new 
topic in studies of the region: the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East.    
 For some scholars, like Samuel Huntington, the persistence of authoritarianism was 
evidence that the region was exceptional—that there was something inherent and particular about 
it that prevented democratization, namely, Middle Eastern culture or more specifically, Islam.  
Others6 attribute the persistence of authoritarianism to the argument of the rentier state theory.  It 
is described in greater detail in the following chapter, but to briefly note here, its main assertion 
is that states can rule through redistributing wealth throughout their societies.  According to the 
theory’s proponents, in terms of the Middle East, oil revenue (and other sources of income) is 
                                                
1 I define the Middle East as the area stretching from North Africa to Iran.   
2 It is impossible to ignore the current developments in the region.  At the time of this writing (March 2012), the 
“Arab Spring” is ongoing in the Middle East.  The Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan governments have fallen, yet the 
democratic outcomes in those countries and in others remains to be seen. 
3 Posusney, “The Middle East’s Democracy Deficit,” 2. 
4 Anderson, 189. 
5 As defined by Samuel Huntington three ‘waves’ of democratization (transitions to democracy) have occurred in 
history, the last of which is still occurring.  The first took place in Europe and North America in the 1880s.  The 
second began after the WWII and ended in the early 1970s.  The third wave began in the mid 1970s in Latin 
America and in eastern European countries formerly controlled by the Soviet Union. [Huntington, Samuel.  The 
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: Univ. Oklahoma Press, 1993]. 
6 See: Ross, Michael; and Karl, Terry L. 
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this ‘wealth’ and they contend that its redistribution enables authoritarian regimes in the region 
to remain in power.  Advocates of this view reached this conclusion after analyzing the impact of 
oil wealth on the state and society.  In other words, they examined the relationship between oil, 
politics, society and the state. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to investigate these relationships in two country case studies: 
Iran and Saudi Arabia.  It will reexamine the conventional wisdom about oil’s effect on state and 
society held by the rentier state theory and offer new insights about the causes of 
authoritarianism in the Middle East.  While oil wealth has unquestionably played an important 
role in the region’s history, it by itself does not create or sustain authoritarian governments.  The 
rentier state theory is problematic because it asserts that oil wealth overrides other causal 
contributing factors.  This thesis challenges this assumption and argues that oil is one of several 
other, arguably more consequential, factors that account for the persistence of authoritarianism in 
the Middle East.   
 The in-depth examination of Iran and Saudi Arabia will reveal that authoritarianism in 
the region can be attributed to geopolitical contexts, specific political processes and socio-
economic conditions in addition to oil.  As such, the following chapters examine both the 
external and internal dynamics of the country case studies.  In terms of the former, the Cold War 
context and the role that oil played will be analyzed.  In terms of the latter, the domestic contexts 
of these countries will also be assessed.  This is important because doing so will reveal Iran and 
Saudi Arabia’s political structures and socio-economic conditions—factors that have contributed 
to these regimes’ survival.   
 Much of the literature on the topic of authoritarianism in the Middle East touch on and 
often discuss in detail the role of international relations and actors in the region.  Given the 
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considerable amount of foreign interaction and penetration into the Middle East during the 
twentieth-century, such discussions inevitably delve into the past and analyze the effects of 
external (Western or others) actors on domestic affairs.  When one thinks of the foreign 
interventionism in the Middle East during the previous century, the natural resource, oil, usually 
comes to mind.  Access to oil was a major economic and geostrategic concern for Western 
powers, Russia and others especially after World War II.  Many scholars contend that Western, 
particularly American, support of authoritarian governments, in return for access to oil and other 
strategic considerations, has directly prevented democratization in the region.7 
 I chose Iran and Saudi Arabia as case studies for several reasons.  Both are considered 
prominent examples as rentier states in that they depend heavily on oil revenues.8  Saudi Arabian 
oil, which amounts to approximately 25% of the world oil reserves, is vital for the world 
economy.9  Its oil revenues, for example, help fund its health care, education system and other 
social services.  Iran possesses the world’s third largest oil reserves as well as the second largest 
natural oil reserves in the world.10  Like Saudi Arabia, Iran has used its oil revenues to fund 
social, economic, and industrial development programs.  Saudi Arabian and Iranian oil thus 
make both countries economically and geopolitically important for the Middle East and the rest 
of the world.   Additionally, the United States has a significant American military presence in 
Saudi Arabia.  From Saudi Arabia’s point of view, this serves as protection against regional 
rivals, and for the United States, it protects American access to oil.  There is no such American 
presence in or even formal diplomatic relations with Iran.   
                                                
7 Posusney, 17. 
8 The theory of the rentier state originated in an essay written by Iranian economist Hussein Mahdavy, where he 
analyzed the Iranian economy during the 1950s and 1960s.  See Mahday, Hussein.  “The Patterns and Problems of 
Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran,” in   M.A. Cook, ed., Studies in Economic History of 
the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).   
9 Niblock, 1-2. 
10 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Iran: Overview/Data,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-
data.cfm?fips=IR [accessed May 29, 2011]. 
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 There are key differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  As the country where the two 
most holy sites of Islam are located, Saudi Arabia possesses a high level of political and religious 
authority in the region.11  Since Iran is a majority Shi’a Muslim country, it has influence over 
other areas in the Middle East, such as Iraq, where large numbers of Shi’a live.  Additionally, 
foreign relations with the rest of the world, particularly the West, tend to be different.  For 
example, Saudi Arabia and the United States are close military and economic allies, whereas the 
United States views Iran with suspicion, especially with its alleged nuclear weapons program.  
The last difference, of which there are many others, mentioned here is that the Saudi Arabian 
government is a monarchy, whereas the Iranian government is an Islamic Republic, in that it is 
both republican and theocratic.  These different political structures are important variables in the 
discussions of the following chapters.        
 It would be impossible to discuss and analyze the entire history of both countries during 
the 20th century, so this thesis focuses on the time period beginning in 1973 to the present day.  
1973 is an important year because oil revenues significantly increased as a consequence of the 
October War, also known as the Yom Kippur War, between Israel and the coalition of Arab 
nations (Syria, Iraq and Jordan) led by Egypt.12  OPEC (the Organization of Arab Exporting 
Countries) decided to reduce oil production in retaliation for American arms supply to Israel 
during the war and some member countries increased oil prices by significant margins.13  This 
resulted in the 1973-1974 Oil Crisis and the subsequent oil boom that lasted until the early 
1980s.  International oil prices quadrupled.  Iran’s oil revenues increased from $5 billion in 
                                                
11 Niblock, 6. 
12 The coalition aimed to recapture lands taken by Israel during the 1967 War, also known as the Six Day War.  
During those six days in June of that year, the Israeli captured the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, East 
Jerusalem, and the West Bank. 
13 Goldschmidt, 339. 
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1973-1974 to $20 billion in 1975-1976.14  The boom altered the Saudi Arabian state and its 
relationship with society.  The state shifted from a modernizing, redistributive and administrative 
state, one that required the knowledge and expertise to run a national economy, towards a mainly 
distributive state, one that allocated oil revenue to subsidies in real estate, agriculture and 
industry; the state bureaucracy increased in size as well.15  In short, 1973 is an appropriate 
starting point not only for its significance, but also that, as the rentier state theory would predict, 
the “rentier qualities” of both Iran and Saudi Arabia intensified during the following years.    
 This thesis consists of five chapters, including this introduction.  Chapter II is the 
theoretical overview of the literature that addresses authoritarianism in the Middle East.  This 
chapter discusses in detail the arguments about the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle 
East and also introduces theoretical arguments that challenge the rentier state theory.  Chapters 
III and IV examine Iran and Saudi Arabia, respectively.  An historical overview up to 1973 
begins each of these two chapters, which is then followed by the main analytical portion of the 
chapters.  Both chapters examine the historical and domestic contexts of their respective 
countries.  Additionally, a discussion about the Arab Spring is at the end of each of these two 
chapters.  Finally, Chapter V is the Conclusion and it also addresses the Arab Spring. 
                                                
14 Abrahamian, 124. 
15 Menoret, 107. 
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Chapter II: Authoritarianism in the Middle East – A Theoretical Overview 
A. Literature Review 
 The question is often asked, why does the Middle East remain largely authoritarian?  Or, 
as it is sometimes posed, why does it continue to experience a democratic deficit 
(notwithstanding the ongoing developments in the region)?  As discussed in the introduction, 
various scholars have put forward several competing theories and arguments regarding this topic.  
These tend to fall under four main categories: culture, institutions, the history of international 
relations and actors in the Middle East, and oil/rentier state.   
 Scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Ellie Kedourie, contend that the lack of 
democracy in the region stems from the belief that Middle Eastern culture, which they equate 
with Islam (the reasons for this are discussed in further detail below), is incompatible with 
democracy.  Huntington made this argument in his well-known 1993 Foreign Affairs article, 
“The Clash of Civilizations?”16  A decade earlier, he asserted that “Islam has not been hospitable 
to democracy.”17  Huntington and other proponents of this view generally argue that Islam’s 
incompatibility with democracy stems from its system of law, known as Shari’a.  Shari’a law 
lays out the rules and regulations by which Muslims ought to live and links religion and daily life 
together.  Thus, the argument contends, Islamic traditions and values are antithetical to 
democratic notions of liberty, human rights, and the separation of church and state.  According to 
Elie Kedourie, whereas democracy in the West is based on Western political traditions of 
constitutions and representational governments, as well as the notion of a sovereign nation state, 
                                                
16 Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer, 1993): 22–49. 
17 Huntington, Samuel P., 208. "Will Countries Become More Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly, 99, no. 82 
(Summer 1984): 193-218. 
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no equivalent traditions exist within Islam.18  As a result, Kedourie asserts, democracy is “quite 
alien to the mindset of Islam.”19  
 Princeton professor Bernard Lewis discusses the culture argument further.20  Although he 
does not specifically address the issue of the persistence of authoritarianism, Lewis holds 
essentially the same conclusion.  He argues that the roots of Western dominance (or, more 
bluntly, Middle Eastern failure to counter it) are found within Islam.  Historically speaking, 
particularly during the last century or so of the Ottoman Empire, Lewis contends, Islamic beliefs 
hindered Muslims from fully adopting and assimilating Western cultural norms and values, 
political practices, and science.  Consequently, for a long time the Middle East was slow to 
“modernize” or “Westernize” and match the progress made by the West; large gaps between the 
Middle East and the West existed in terms of scientific knowledge, social norms like the status of 
women, and the separation of religion and the state.  When attempts at nationalism and socialism 
in the 20th century failed to bring about a significant resurgence of Middle Eastern “civilization,” 
Middle Easterners placed the blame for this elsewhere, particularly towards Western 
“imperialism.”21  Instead, Lewis states that people of the Middle East need to “abandon 
grievance and victimhood” in order for the region to return its former glory.22 
  All of these arguments are rooted in what Edward Said called “Orientalism.” According 
to Said, Orientalism is the name for the discourse employed by Europeans and later, Americans, 
to describe, study, and dominate the Middle East.23  There is not sufficient space nor is it 
appropriate for this thesis to discuss Orientalism in its entirety here.  However, one important 
                                                
18 Kedourie, 3. 
19 1.  
20 Lewis, Bernard.  What Went Wrong: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002. 
21 153. 
22 160. 
23 Said, Edward. Orientalism.  New York: Vintage Books, 1979. 
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aspect of it pertains to the culture argument discussed above: the notion of the “other.”  The 
“other” is as an imagined, collective group of people who ought to be feared and considered 
fundamentally different from another group.  In the Orientalist discourse, the West has 
historically viewed the Orient24 as the collective “other;” the Orient was a place of exoticism, 
romance and antiquity, whereas Europe was the place of enlightened, advanced and sophisticated 
civilization.   
 In its construction of the notion of the “other,” the discourse regarded the entire Middle 
East as one unchanging entity, retaining an essential “essence.”  Orientalists regarded the 
religion of Islam as having such an immutable essence and subsequently equated Middle Eastern 
culture with Islam.  When it became clear to scholars that democracy would not spread to the 
Middle East after the Cold War as it did in other parts of the world, they began to look towards 
Middle Eastern culture, and hence Islam, as the primary reason for the lack of democracy in the 
region.  Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis reinforced the notion that culture, rather than 
nation states, ought to be the main focus of study in the field of international studies.25  
 Other scholars have presented factual data to support the notion of the Islam/democracy 
divide.  In a 2002 paper, Steven Fish argues through statistical analysis that a strong link exists 
between Islam and authoritarianism.26  Specifically, he contends, the subordination of women in 
Muslim societies is a central factor that accounts for the democratic deficit.  According to Fish, 
variables, such as low female literacy rates, high population sex ratios (a high number of males 
per 100 females), the lower number of women in government, and weak gender empowerment 
                                                
24 The ‘Orient’ referred to not only the Middle East but also the entire Asian continent and North Africa.  
25 Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993): pp. 22-49.  
In his article, Huntington sees the world divided into several distinct and separate “civilizations,” which include 
Western, Latin-American and Islamic civilizations.  Nation states would continue to be the main actors in world 
affairs but conflict would arise “between nations and [these] groups of different civilizations” 
26 Fish, Steven.  “Islam and Authoritarianism,” World Politics 55 (October 2002): 4-37. 
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measures (a variable used by the United Nations Development Program studies to measure the 
overall status of women in a given society), indicate an overall inferior status of women in 
Muslim societies.  Thus, women’s social standing serves as an important factor that links 
authoritarianism and Islam.   
 However, most Middle East political scientists and scholars rejected the idea that culture 
had anything to do with the persistence of authoritarianism in the region.27  As Lisa Anderson 
states, scholars asserted that Islam was not a monolithic entity; its history demonstrated it to be 
as tolerant and accommodating like Judaism and Christianity.28  She points out that followers of 
Islam and other religions in general have interpreted them in different ways.  Furthermore, 
according to John L. Esposito, all religions, including Islam, have had various relations with 
different kinds of governments, such as sultanates, democracy, republicanism and monarchy.29  
This evidence indicates that Islam is much like other faiths in that it is capable of existing 
alongside different kinds of governments at different times.  Therefore, it is inaccurate to argue 
that Islam is incompatible with democracy or any other form of government.  The cultural 
explanation ultimately fails to see the complexity of Middle East, which is as diverse as every 
other region in the world, and Islam, which is equally varied.   
 Alternatively, some scholars have directed their attention to Middle Eastern institutions 
instead of culture.  Some have argued that the region’s lack of “democratic prerequisites” such as 
strong civil societies, market-driven economies, high literacy rates and representational 
government institutions accounts for the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East.30  
However, the fact that countries in the region possess a number of these so-called prerequisites 
                                                
27 Anderson, 197. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Esposito, 144. Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
30 Bellin, 139-141. 
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challenges this idea.  For example, several countries in the region have democratic institutions 
such as parliaments, political parties, judiciaries and elections. 
 According to Marsha P. Posusney, there are two general types of institutions: formal 
organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure political conduct.31  These include 
political parties, government military/security agencies, different branches of government, and 
elections and the rules that govern them.32  Stephen Cook (2005) argues that it is not a lack of 
institutions in the region prevent democratic reform and development, rather, it is the flawed 
“nature” of the institutions themselves that “tend to restrict political participation, limit 
individual freedom, and vest overwhelming power in the executive branch of government.”33  
For example, Cook states that in 2004 citizens of Qatar received greater freedoms in the new 
constitution, but the royal family consolidated its absolute rule. 
 State manipulation of elections is perhaps the most apparent (and well documented in the 
literature) means for authoritarian governments in the Middle East to maintain their positions in 
power.  Posusney illustrates this by describing contested, albeit largely controlled, parliamentary 
elections throughout Middle East during the early 1960s to 2000.34  The preferred electoral 
structure used in the region is a “winner takes all” system, where the party that wins the majority 
of seats also gains the most power.35  In Egypt, party contested parliamentary elections began 
under late president Anwar Sadat in 1976.  However, according to Posusney, Sadat ensured that 
the government-backed party would win the majority of the seats, which is what occurred.  In 
1984, president Hosni Mubarak led a new round a elections but the outcome remained the same: 
the ruling party, which came to be known as the National Democratic Party, won the majority of 
                                                
31 Posusney, 7. “The Middle East’s Democracy Deficit.”   
32 Ibid. 
33 Cook, Stephen, 96. “The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (2005): 91-102. 
34 Posusney, “Multiparty Elections in the Arab World.” 
35 94.   
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the seats, while only garnering 73% of the popular vote.36    
 According to Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, in addition to parliaments and 
elections, authoritarian regimes in the region have also established other institutions such as new 
government ministries and institutions that arbitrate economic disputes.37  They have also 
allowed the establishment of NGOs, parliaments to enact antitrust legislation, and a more open 
and freer press.38  The effect of all of these, according to the authors, is the creation of the 
appearance of democracy for both domestic and foreign audiences.  For example, the authors 
argue, allowing NGOs to operate creates the semblance of autonomous societal organization, and 
allowing political parties to form creates the appearance of true political contestation.  In short, 
the establishment of institutions is a means and a strategy for authoritarian regimes in the Middle 
East to claim to have enacted democratic reform when in reality it is more likely the projection 
of an appearance of democracy.39   
 The third set of explanations for the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East— 
the history of international relations with the region—is predominantly about the legacy of 
foreign, primarily Western, interventionism in to the region during the 20th century and it is 
directly related to the oil/rentier state literature, which will be discussed in detail shortly.  Middle 
Eastern oil was (and continues to be) of great geopolitical and economic importance for the 
entire world.  British businessman William Knox D’Arcy first discovered oil in modern day Iran 
in 1908, but it was not until after World War II that oil would have a significant and long-lasting 
impact in terms of the potential for democratic prospects in the Middle East.40  As will be 
                                                
36 95-96. 
37 Albrecht, Holger and Schlumberger, Oliver., 380. “‘Waiting for Godot’: Regime Change Without 
Democratization in the Middle East,” International Political Science Review 25, no. 4 (2004): 371-392. 
38 Ibid. 
39 381. 
40 Mitchell, 408. 
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explored further in the chapter four, the Saudi Arabian experience is perhaps the most striking 
illustration of this.   
 The oil/rentier state literature is the fourth category of explanations for the persistence of 
authoritarianism in the Middle East.  The literature in this category explores the possible linkages 
between natural resources and regime type.41  In other words, scholars within this category 
examine whether natural resources (such as oil or minerals) determine either democratic or 
authoritarian political outcomes.  Many of these scholars argue the latter.  According to Terry 
Lynn Karl, commodity-led growth causes institutional change within the state; natural resource 
revenue, more so than any other factors, triggers these kinds of structural alterations.42  States 
that undergo such changes are called rentier states. 
 The rentier state theory is as follows.  According to the theory, rent is income that isn't 
generated by the “productive” processes of a country—i.e., the wealth generated by a country's 
everyday economic activities such as consumption (people's wages spent on consumer goods), 
industrial output (manufactured goods to be sold and the profits earned), and taxation.43  Instead, 
rent is income derived from “unproductive” sources: the monopoly ownership of land (by the 
state or foreign companies) and the extraction and selling of natural resources, strategic rents 
                                                
41 For example, see, Ross, Michael. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, no. 3 (Apr., 2001): 325-361; 
and, Dunning, Thad. Crude Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
42 Karl, 7. 
43 Beblawi, 85-86.  In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith stated that there are three sources of income: rent, wages 
and profits.  Rent, according to Smith, is the income received from the property ownership of land—it is the money 
earned from the leasing of the land for agricultural, mining, or other uses, and the profits from the sale of the natural 
resources or food that are produced.  In other words, the landowner does not actively work on it to receive a wage, 
but is instead the recipient of a large share or most of the wealth.  This type of wealth that accrues to the property 
owner is called ‘unearned’ income and is the essential characteristic of rent.  In classical economics, these 
landowners were called ‘rentiers’ because, to reiterate, instead of working for a living wage, rentiers extracted a 
‘rent’ from the profits of the work done on his property as well as the money paid for the use of the land. The onset 
of enormous oil revenues in some Middle Eastern countries beginning with the oil shocks of the 1970s resurrected 
the notion of ‘unearned income’ from classical economics.  Scholars asserted that these revenues were a modern 
manifestation of unearned income: oil revenue came to be seen as a kind of rent in the same manner as the rent that 
accrued to property owners in classical economics.       
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(such as land leased for military bases), foreign worker remittances, foreign aid, and others.  
Thus the majority of rent comes from external sources.44   
 A rentier-state is a state in which its monopoly ownership of a resource determines the 
nature of its politics.45  The rent revenue generated from monopoly ownership determines a 
state’s political structures.  According to the theory, rent income concentrates wealth towards the 
state, which is the primary recipient and distributor of rent revenues.46  The state becomes 
dependent on these revenues and this dependence fundamentally shifts its decision-making 
process towards maintaining the extraction of rent income in the future.47  More to the point, the 
infusion of rents, which are typically very large, allows the state to become relatively 
autonomous from society.  Therefore, the state leaders do not need to (or very minimally so) 
extract income from society through taxation, and thus be held accountable by society.  Their 
economic independence—and the reliance upon official largesse by entire segments of society—
fosters the concentration of political power in the state. 
 This, then, gets to the core of the theory’s argument.  The theory asserts that states can 
only “democratize” when the ruler and his subjects bargain over taxes.48  This happens when the 
state does not have any source of income to fund its operations other than the taxes it imposes on 
its subjects.  As a result, the state becomes reliant on its citizens and therefore must 
accommodate their demands, which they express in representative, legislative bodies such as 
parliaments.  In other words, citizens accept taxation in exchange for representation in the state 
and in this way society is able to hold the government accountable.  This relationship is summed 
up in the phrase “no representation without taxation.”   
                                                
44 Mahdavy, 428. 
45 Karl, 13. 
46 Beblawi, 89.   
47 Karl, 197. 
48 Herb, 256.   
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 The state-society relationship is the opposite in rentier states.  Society is not involved 
with the production of national wealth and taxed very little or not at all.  Therefore society has 
little or no say in state decision-making.  However, to offset any opposition or dissent towards 
the state, rentier states create an apolitical and acquiescent society by providing free or 
affordable social services in areas such as health care and education.  Thus a rentier state bases 
its authority and legitimacy on the redistribution rent wealth rather than taxation.  In sum, 
according to the theory, rent income is therefore deterministic: it shapes the politics of the state 
by giving the state the financial autonomy to possess and wield political and economic power.  
The state becomes powerful, authoritarian, and undemocratic as a result of all of these factors. 
B. Analysis of the Literature 
 Lisa Anderson and the other scholars she cites in her article are correct to assert that the 
culture argument is an insufficient explanation for the persistence of authoritarianism in the 
region.  As described earlier, proponents of this argument equate Middle Eastern culture with 
Islam and thus view the Middle East as one homogenous, unchanging entity: an “Islamic 
civilization.”  The entire region is considered exceptional, unlike other parts of the world.  By 
equating culture with Islam, the culture explanation fails to understand the region’s complexity 
in terms of its history and cultural and religious diversity.  The Arabic language and Islam may 
be the prevalent features of the Middle East, yet every country in the region possesses its own 
Arabic dialect, particular history and cultural/ethnic makeup.   
 The examination of institutions in the Middle East is a more sound approach than the 
focus on culture because its conclusions—that government institutions in the region are 
undemocratic in nature; that elections have been manipulated; that governments have established 
agencies and other state organizations as well allowing the space for political party formation; 
and that give the overall appearance of democracy—are based on concrete examples such as the 
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manipulation of elections in Egypt described earlier.  Indeed, flawed institutions do exist in the 
region but these problems are certainly not limited to the Middle East.  While they do shed light 
on the tactics used by authoritarian regimes, by themselves, institutional explanations are not 
sufficient reasons for the persistence of authoritarianism.  Moreover, democracies often exhibit 
the same detrimental political behavior of authoritarian regimes such as corruption and 
manipulation of elections.  Thus the Middle East is not exceptional in terms of flawed 
institutions.  
 As for the rentier state theory, even though a number of scholars have challenged, 
critiqued and reexamined it, it has been “the dominant theoretical paradigm in the study of 
Middle Eastern monarchies”49 and continues to be so in the study of Middle Eastern political 
economy and the persistence of authoritarianism in region.  However, similar to the literature 
that looks at culture, the oil/rentier state literature tends to simplify the complex reality of the 
region’s history, the relationships between oil, society and the state, and the internal political 
structures and dynamics of the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.   
 There are two main limitations of the rentier state theory.  The first is one is that the 
theory does not look deeply at the process of natural resource production itself.  This is 
particularly evident in the development of the Saudi Arabian oil industry, which will be touched 
on in Chapter IV.  The other limitation is the claim that rent revenue alone determines state 
structures and molds political outcomes, thereby largely freeing the state from societal demands 
and giving it a high level of autonomy.  The examinations of Saudi Arabia and Iran in the 
following chapters illustrate why this point is problematic.  
 Columbia University professor Timothy Mitchell addresses the first limitation.  He 
contends that proponents of the rentier state theory tend not to discuss the historical background 
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of the oil industry in the region nor the production, distribution and use of oil; the focus remains 
mostly on the oil revenues that accrue to the state after the oil is sold on the market.50  This, 
Mitchell argues, prevents scholars from examining “the flow of oil” and the centers of power 
located within the process of oil production: where the sources of the undemocratic politics in 
the Middle East stem from.51   
 According to Mitchell, the harnessing of fossil fuels, first from coal and then from oil, 
resulted in both democratic and undemocratic politics.  He argues that the production and use of 
coal as a primary source of energy, along with other factors such as urbanization, facilitated the 
beginning of what he calls the “collective life out of which late-nineteenth-century mass politics 
developed.”52  Mitchell states that the flow of coal production involved large networks and 
“main junctions” where large numbers of workers as well as large “concentrations of carbon 
energy” were concentrated.  As a result, coal workers had significant political power in the form 
of strikes that occurred in Europe and the United States.  Strikes forced industry leaders and their 
allies in the government to accept welfare democracy and universal suffrage.53  Thus coal 
production made possible the “forms of democracy that emerged in leading industrial nations by 
the middle decades of the 20th century”.54 
 The switch to oil as the primary source of energy for the world after WWII, Mitchell 
argues, significantly decreased worker mobilization (though not entirely) and hence the 
possibility for democratic politics where oil production took place, particularly in the Middle 
East.  Oil production involves a smaller workforce, is pumped from the ground, and is more 
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easily transported than coal through pipelines, tanker shipping and other kinds of transportation.  
As a result, according to Mitchell, the potential for oil strikes and the political demands 
(including better working conditions, political constitutions, the right to unionize and form 
political parties) that they call for, decreased.  Additionally, after the war oil companies, 
American and others, began to take control over the production and distribution of Middle 
Eastern oil, maintaining control by limiting supply in order to keep profits high.55  The British 
suppressed the oil worker strikes that did occur, such as in Iraq and Palestine.  After the war in 
Lebanon and, as will be discussed in the following chapters, in Saudi Arabia and Iran, the United 
States used its political and economic power to force favorable oil producing conditions.56   
 The second limitation, the assertion that rent revenues alone shape state structures and 
decision-making which gives the state its own agency and separates it from society, is 
problematic as well.  According to University of Pennsylvania professor Bob Jessop, a state is 
comprised of a “core” of a “distinct    
ensemble of multifunctional institutions and organizations whose socially acceptable function is 
to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society in the name of 
their common interest of general will.”57 
 
For Jessop, this definition acknowledges the general notion of the state as a “macro-political 
organization” and the connections between it and society.  The latter acknowledgement is 
important for this thesis.  According to Jessop, the state can never completely separate itself from 
society and the boundaries between them are not clear; the state depends on numerous “micro-
political practices” spread out throughout society.58  Stephen Hertog expands on this notion in 
his examination of state-society relations in Saudi Arabia.  This will be discussed in detail in 
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Chapter IV.  To briefly note here, Hertog finds that the Saudi state extends its reach in to society 
through numerous state agencies and organizations, and that lower levels of society can in fact 
affect the outcomes of government policies.  Furthermore, Jessop argues, state institutions are 
shaped by the nature of past social formation processes.  In other words, states are not formed in 
a vacuum; they arise out of the social context from which they are formed and continue to be 
shaped by society. 
 Timothy Mitchell echoes Jessop’s view of the state.59  Like Jessop, Mitchell argues that 
the state and society are not two separate, distinct entities.  Rather, the boundaries between them 
are permeable and overlapping; society can shape the state and vice-versa.  For example, 
Mitchell discusses banking.  National and international corporations, government treasuries, 
multinational organizations like the World Bank, semipublic central banks (such as the U.S. 
Federal Reserve) and others, are all interconnected.  Therefore, Mitchell contends, it is 
impossible to separate the financial realm from the public realm.60  However, according to 
Mitchell, internal political processes of the modern state create the “effect” of a clear 
“distinction” between state and society.  Powerful actors, which include political and economic 
actors, promote this distinction in order to maintain an existing political and social order that 
allows them to retain their positions of influence and control.61  Thus the appearance of a 
distinction between state and society “disguises” the relationships of power that are invested in 
maintaining the existing system of governance.   
   In terms of this thesis, the relationship between the national oil companies (NOCs) in 
Saudi Arabia and Iran and their respective governments is another example of the blurring of the 
                                                
59 Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics.” 
60 90. 
61 78. 
  19 
lines between state and society.  In a 2006 study62, Valerie Marcel finds that NOCs in the Middle 
East have evolved from being primarily nationalistic enterprises towards more market-oriented 
and international driven companies.  However, because governments continue to own them, they 
cannot operate like fully independent, international companies.  As a result, governments have a 
great amount of say in discussions about company policies and strategies.63 
 Mitchell and Jessop’s arguments are important to this thesis because they problematize 
the supposed effects of oil—that oil revenues simply accrue to the state and help authoritarian 
regimes remain in power; that oil wealth determines state structures (i.e., that a state will be 
authoritarian); and the assertion that the state becomes largely autonomous and separate from 
society.  In terms of the first limitation, Mitchell reveals that oil production involves much more 
than the profits the state receives; it involves a process in which certain actors maintain power 
and control.  Both Jessop and Mitchell provide strong theoretical arguments about state-society 
relations that complicate the rentier state theory.  They show that numerous linkages exist 
between the state and society and that both shape and influence each other thus challenging a 
major component of the theory.  
 Jessop and Mitchell both provide a basis on which to begin to examine the relationships 
between oil, politics, society and the state in Saudi Arabia and Iran.  Mitchell demonstrates that it 
is essential for scholars to look beyond the profits of oil production and examine other factors 
that may cause authoritarian persistence.  He and Jessop show that the state-society boundaries 
overlap.  Thus in order to get to a deeper level of understanding of the factors that lead to and 
sustain authoritarianism in both countries, it is necessary to move away from the rentier state 
theory.  Doing so will demonstrate that oil, though important, alone cannot account for Saudi 
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Arabian and Iranian authoritarianism.  The alternative explanatory variables proposed in this 
thesis are: 
• Political Structures 
• Religion 
• History/Actions of External Actors 
• State Mechanisms and Strategies  
 
 As stated at the end of the introduction, this thesis contends that it is necessary to 
examine the case studies externally and internally.  The scholars reviewed in this chapter have 
approached the issue of authoritarianism in the Middle East in this manner but questions still 
remain: to what extent has the role that oil played beyond the notion that it is simply 
redistributed?; what exactly were the effects of foreign interventionism in the region?; what are 
the internal social, economic and political conditions within the case studies and how have they 
contributed to the resilience of the Saudi and Iranian regimes?; and, are societies of rentier states 
depoliticized as the theory assumes?  The following chapters address all of these questions and 
demonstrate that multi-causal factors account for the persistence of authoritarianism in the 
Middle East, rather than one overall argument such as the rentier state theory. 
  21 
Chapter III: The Case of Iran 
A. Historical Overview 
 Two monarchies ruled Iran prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution.  The Qajar Dynasty was 
in power since its founding in 1796 until a senior military general, Reza Khan, orchestrated a 
military coup in 1921 and crowned himself Shah (king) in 1926, establishing the Pahlavi 
Dynasty.64  Reza Shah Pahlavi created a strong, centralized state based on two “pillars”: the 
military and the bureaucracy, both of which he significantly expanded during his reign.  He 
aimed to widen the state’s reach into society and economy.65  Not surprisingly, tribal families, 
Islamic clergy, and young intellectuals all opposed the Shah’s heavy-handed rule.66  The British 
and Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 (in order to secure access to oil during World War II) 
terminated his reign and he abdicated the throne to his son Muhammad Reza.67 
 The first thirteen years of Muhammad Reza’s reign, known as the “nationalist 
interregnum,” was a period of time when the Shah promised to rule as a constitutional monarch 
rather than as a supreme leader like his father before him.  The period also marked the rise of the 
Tudeh Party, a socialist-democratic party that called for democratic reforms such as increased 
political, civic and social liberties and legislation that would address the needs of the poor.68  It 
also stressed the importance of Iranian national identity and called for the nationalization of the 
oil industry.  The party went into decline in late 1940s but its goals of mass mobilization and 
mass politics would remain.   
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 The interregnum also witnessed the rise of the nationalist movement.  Led by Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, the movement almost terminated the Pahlavi monarchy.  Under 
his leadership, in the spring of 1951 the Majlis passed a bill that nationalized Iran’s oil industry.  
The government also established the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).  Nationalization 
threatened British control of oil production and the United States worried that the unstable nature 
of Iranian politics would lead to increased Soviet influence in Iran.  These factors prompted the 
British and Americans to remove Mosaddeq from power and reinstate the Shah, who had fled 
Iran, in a coup in August, 1953.  The coup delegitimized the rule of the Mohammad Reza and 
permanently identified his reign with Britain and the United States.69  
 Back in power, the Shah launched his state modernization and expansion plans.  The 
military, the state bureaucracy and the system of court patronage that supplied the Shah with 
supporters, all increased in size.  In 1963, he initiated the White Revolution, a series of reforms 
that aimed to improve the lives of Iranians.  Land reform was its centerpiece.  The goal was to 
bring economic prosperity to Iran, make Iran powerful, and ultimately break the grip on power of 
the landowning class in the countryside.70  Reforms also developed the industrial sector which 
attracted workers to urban centers.  Socially, the White Revolution brought about improvements 
in education and health.  The effect of the revolution was far reaching in that it led to economic 
and social structural shifts: from agriculture to industry, countryside to town, and the political 
power of landowning notables to the state.71   
 Oil revenues funded these reforms.  The oil consortium agreement in 1954 resumed the 
flow of oil royalties, which had been stalled for a couple of years, paid to the Iranian 
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government.72  The 1973 Oil Shock dramatically increased Iran’s oil revenues, which reached to 
twenty billion dollars in 1976.73  However, despite these increases and the gains achieved in the 
White Revolution, Iranians overthrew the Shah in the Iranian Revolution of 1979.  The Shah 
failed to fully gain the support of the poorer classes: living conditions did not improve in the 
countryside and the wealth gap between the poor and wealthy widened.  He also alienated the 
middle class and, importantly, the clergy who subsequently supported Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, the leading Shi’a cleric in Iran who became the leader of the revolution.    
 According to the rentier state theory, the Iranian Revolution should not have happened 
and the monarchy should have endured.  Iran’s oil revenues in the 1970s were quite large, which, 
by the theory’s reasoning, ought to have been sufficient to keep the regime in power.  Terry 
Lynn Karl (1997) argues that “petro-states,” countries in which oil is the dominant or significant 
component of their economies, are inherently vulnerable because dependence on oil revenues, 
especially during oil booms, weaken the administrative capacity of the state while at the same 
time expanding state-led development.74  This means that as the state increasingly relies on oil 
income for its revenues, as opposed to from taxes, the state loses its ability to make sound 
economic regulatory decisions because it rules through public spending rather than smart 
management of the economy.75  Thus Karl attributes the monarchy’s demise to its dependence on 
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oil revenues and the destabilizing effects such dependence generates.76  This evidence suggests 
that instead of creating stable regimes, oil contributes to government instability and structural 
weakness.  However the Iranian Revolution, discussed in more detail below, demonstrates that 
oil cannot be the only factor that caused the instability that resulted in the Shah’s demise. The 
Shah’s authoritarian methods, combined with the vast corruption and wastefulness of his regime 
as well as the end of the oil boom in the latter years of the 1970s, played a far more decisive role 
in fostering the massive revolution that toppled the Shah. 
 Some may argue that the current economic conditions in Iran are evidence that support 
the theory as well.  As for much of its recent history, the oil and natural gas industries dominate 
the Iran’s economy.  The state retains ownership of many of the large economic enterprises, such 
as the oil industry, and according to current World Bank data, in 2009 the GDP of Iran was $331 
billion and the share of oil revenues amounted to approximately 23.7% of GDP, down from 
40.3% the previous year.77  As of 2010, oil revenues provided Iran with approximately half of 
the government’s revenues and oil and its derivatives amounted to roughly 80% of Iran’s total 
exports.78  Manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and technology sectors largely constitute the 
remainder of the economy.  The government is currently in the process of a five-year (2010-
2015) privatization plan to diversify the economy but factors such as unemployment, falling and 
unstable oil prices, large government subsidies, inefficient public sector enterprises, and foreign 
economic sanctions have hampered this effort.  Some may contend that that despite these 
unfavorable conditions, especially the uncertainty in the global oil markets, the oil sector is what 
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is enabling the regime to remain in power.  As discussed in the next section, however, other 
factors have played a significant role. 
B. Regime Resilience: Mechanisms, Strategies and Political Structures of the Islamic Republic 
  The Iranian Revolution, which took place in February 1979, ushered in a new, but 
different authoritarian regime.79  The revolution was a broadly based social uprising composed of 
Ayotallah Ruhollah Khomeini and his clerical and non-clerical followers, constitutional liberals, 
Marxists and other leftists, Iranian university students, women’s rights groups, urban poor, and 
others.  The Islamic clergy, led by Khomeini, was by far the most organized out of all the 
revolutionary groups.  By April 1979 they were able to outmaneuver the secular groups, which 
were fragmented and did not possess a leader capable of matching Khomeini in stature and 
leadership.80  On April 1st, 98% of Iranians approved the founding of an Islamic Republic in a 
national referendum.  In November, the Assembly of Experts, a 70-member body appointed by 
Khomeini of supporters of the Islamist government, approved a new constitution which placed 
the concept of “velayat-e faqeh” (the Guardianship of the Jurist; the notion that only senior 
Islamic clerics possess the authority to rule the state) as the unifying ideology and basis for the 
Islamic Republic.81  In other words, the constitution codified the authority of the clergy.  As will 
be discussed later in this chapter, this would play a crucial role for the new regime’s survival in 
the coming decades.  
 The emergence of the Islamic Republic challenges the notion that oil revenue is the only 
variable that directly shapes state formation.  The discussion about the state-society relationship 
towards the end of the previous chapter makes clear that many factors affect state structures.  
                                                
79 The Islamic Republic retained the state bureaucracy of the Pahlavi monarchy and expanded it. 
80 Azimi, 358.  The nationalization of the oil industry, which entailed the full elimination of the oil consortium, and 
the hostage crisis, which began in November, were two key events that helped solidify the new government’s rule. 
81 Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 164.  
  26 
Sami Zubaida (1993) argues that scholars ought to examine Middle Eastern countries through the 
socio-economic processes shape their politics and societies.82   
 Understanding the context in which the Iranian Revolution took place is an excellent 
example of this.  Although oil would remain a significant part of the Iranian economy after the 
revolution, clerical Islam and the idea of a centralized Islamic Republic arose out of the complex 
socio-economic and repressive context of the Pahlavi regime.83  The Iranian government under 
the Shah directly controlled the press, trade unions and the legal system, and created the secret 
police force called the Savak, which the government used to enforce its policies.  Consequently, 
the Shah alienated most parts of society, including and importantly, the Shi’a clergy who had 
increasingly become subordinated to the modernization of the White Revolution.   
 Shi’ism in Iran was a significant part of the social fabric; it was deeply embedded within 
Iranian society through mosques, religious schools called madrasas, seminaries and shrines.84  
Additionally, the clergy received various forms of religious taxes (called zakat and khuns) and 
income in to endowments (waqfs) from the traditional bazaar and devout Shi’a Muslims in return 
for legal, educational and religious services.85  The educational, judicial, and economic reforms 
of the White Revolution terminated most of the clergy’s traditional roles in these areas.  For 
example, the government attempted to appropriate some of the clergy’s influence by establishing 
a ‘religion corps,’ which attempted to teach religion in the countryside.86  The government also 
established theology as an academic discipline to challenge the influence of the seminaries and 
extended “state control over the management of pious endowments”.87 
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 Before this transition, Shi’a clergy had generally accepted the role of a secular leader as 
long as he allowed them to practice their faith in peace and as a result, most senior Shi’a clerics 
called mujtahids stayed away from politics.88  However, the White Revolution and the repression 
and corruption of the Pahlavi regime eventually served as the catalyst for increased Shi’a 
activism, led by Khomeini.  Khomeini was the most vocal opponent mujtahid of the Shah and by 
1963 he assumed the role as the leading voice among the radical clergy that opposed the 
regime.89  The government exiled in him in 1964 and in 1965 he moved to the third holiest city 
in Shi’a Islam, Najaf, Iraq.   
 There, Khomeini crafted his vision of an Islamic government.90  He melded criticisms 
and ideas of other radical Shi’a into one broad critique of the Pahlavi regime.  Some of these 
Shi’a clerics criticized the increased westernization, or “westoxification,” in Iran, which they 
thought had gradually eroded Islamic culture, particularly the greater freedoms given to women 
in terms of traditional customs.91  Other clerics argued that the clergy ought to be more socially 
and politically active.  Ultimately, Khomeini deeply believed in the concept of velayat-e faqeh 
and was determined to establish an Islamic government, one that aimed to fully transform society 
towards a more culturally Islamic way of life and serve as the unquestionable overseer of this 
transition; he wanted a government that combined “Islamist-ideological and political power in 
the service of an Islamist state.”92    
 Khomeini also incorporated into his vision social, political and economic criticisms of the 
regime that all Iranians could agree on.  In addition to the corruption and repression that 
characterized the government, he condemned the Shah’s absolute rule and often disregard of the 
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constitution.  Khomeini denounced the regime’s close and compliant role to foreign interests 
during the Cold War which, for Iranians, violated their country’s national sovereignty.93  Other 
criticisms included: the excessive amounts of money allocated towards the military; failing to 
develop the agricultural sector; failing to develop sufficient social services in rural areas; failing 
to protect the bazaar from foreigners and state-connected entrepreneurs; and, failing to address 
general problems of crime and drug addiction.94 
 The emergence of the Islamic Republic and the formation of its state structures thus had 
less to do with oil than with Muhammad Reza Shah’s regime.  The Shah ought to have been able 
to stay in power with the oil revenues at his disposal but this does not account for the decades of 
repressive rule and mismanagement that undermined his authority.  This does not suggest that oil 
was irrelevant but it does suggest that oil revenue on its own is not a sufficient predictor of 
regime stability.  Moreover, foreign control of oil production in Iran foreign involvement in 
Iranian politics post-1951 was consistently a sore point for Iranians and a liability for the Shah.  
Some Iranian oil professionals complained that the compensation they were required to pay to 
foreign companies was far too high.95  Ultimately, the mutual relationship between foreign 
interests and the Shah was the most serious grievance many Iranians held against the monarchy; 
it was an affront to Iranian sovereignty.   
 The White Revolution thus indirectly fostered the rise of politically active Shi’ism in 
Iran.  Until the early 1960s, the clergy was generally acquiescent and reactive to the political 
environment around them and its politics had been primarily internal amongst clerics themselves 
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and religious institutions.96  As described above, this changed when Khomeini began to publicly 
and fervently denounce the Shah.  After the revolution, it was Khomeini and other members of 
the new government who shaped the political structures of the Islamic Republic.   
 Despite an overwhelming revolution in which large portions of society supported the 
ouster of the Pahlavi regime, the new government’s grip on to power was tenuous, particularly 
during the period immediately after the overthrow in which the new constitution was drafted.  
Neither the clergy nor the opposition possessed a precise vision as to what the government of an 
Islamic Republic would be; the rhetoric of the revolution consisted of mostly broad notions of 
social justice, liberty, independence and of the idea of a nation based on Islamic ideals and 
laws.97  However, there were sharp differences between, on the one hand Khomeini and his 
supporters who comprised the newly formed Islamic Republic Party, and on the other hand, the 
prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan and other members of the Provisional Government.98  Khomeini 
and his faction wanted to institutionalize Islam whereas Barzagan and the other nationalists 
preferred a secular, democratic constitution based on Islamic principles.99 
  By the end of 1982, however, the clergy consolidated its power by defeating the leftist-
secular elements of the revolution and the new government was firmly in control.100  The Iranian 
government emerged essentially as a hybrid political regime.  It can be described as a theocratic 
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republic, consisting of a ‘shadow’ clerical side and an official side to the government.101  In 
terms of the former, the preamble and Article 4 of the new constitution both placed Shari’a law 
as the unifying ideology and basis for the Islamic Republic.102  This was encapsulated in the 
aforementioned concept of velayat-e faqih, which declares that the Iranian government not only 
be based on Sharia’a law, but that in order for this to be successful, a leading Islamic jurist, the 
Ayatollah, who is to be appointed by the Assembly Experts, must provide political 
‘guardianship’ over the people.  The assembly appointed Khomeini.  Furthermore, the 
constitution founded the very powerful Guardian Council, the body of twelve Islamic jurists 
given the task of interpreting the constitution, ensuring that any new legislation adheres to 
Islamic law, and overseeing the elections of as well as approving the candidates to parliament, 
the presidency, and the Assembly of Experts.    
 Although Islamic law takes precedence in the constitution, the constitution itself is 
primarily non-Islamic.103  It is actually based on the French government established by Charles 
de Gaulle, the Fifth Republic.  As such, the constitution divides government into branches: the 
executive, the national parliament and the judiciary.  The government itself is highly 
centralized.104  The president was defined as the chief executive, second only to the Supreme 
Leader, and was in charge of his cabinet, appointing officials to various ministries as well as 
ambassadors, governors and mayors.105  The Majlis consists of 270 elected representatives who 
craft legislation, approve the president’s appointment of ministers, as well as several other duties 
too long to list here.  The Supreme Court and regional and local courts, and the Ministry of 
Justice, which is headed by the Attorney General, compose judiciary branch of government in 
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Iran.106  Above all, however, the ultimate authority of the government lies with the Supreme 
Leader. 
 The dual, or hybrid, nature of the government—republican and theocratic—has played an 
essential role in maintaining the regimes’ longevity and hence authoritarianism in Iran.  One 
mechanism for regime maintenance is the regime’s fostering of elite factionalism and 
contestation within the government.  This allows for “differences to emerge and persist but 
simultaneously prevents the aggregation of interests” that would challenge the authority of the 
clergy and bring about a transition to democracy.107  Contrary to some democratization literature, 
which argues that elite factionalism and confrontation is a prerequisite for democratic transition, 
Iran’s case demonstrates that elite factionalism does not always lead to the downfall of 
authoritarianism.108   
 The origins of elite fragmentation stem from the highly diverse composition of the 
revolutionary movement and the dual nature of the government that emerged from it.109  In other 
words, competition between different groups not only became a central characteristic of the new 
government (as it is in almost every kind of government), the competition in itself is one factor 
that enables the regime to survive.  In fact, even though the regime often repressed dissent 
through censoring the media, its structure allows for political space for criticism from both 
clerical and even secular dissent.110   
 From the very outset of the establishment of the Islamic Republic significant differences 
existed between elite conservative and reformist factions who argued over the socio-economic 
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policies the government ought to pursue.  Bazargan and his camp argued for conservative 
reforms.  For them, and later a small but powerful coalition of clergy, the economy needed 
moderate reforms; the government only needed to create a space for the private sector to flourish 
and not intervene in it.111  Additionally, they asserted that the government ought to protect and 
respect property rights, and only nationalize large industries or companies when the national 
interest of the country was at stake.112  The reformists comprised the opposing camp, led the first 
president of the Islamic Republic, Abolhasan Bani Sadr.  They called for an interventionist 
government that would regulate the economy and thereby place restrictions on property rights.  
They argued that Islamic economic principles ought to be interpreted according to modern times 
and not strictly adhere to Shari’a law; they believed that capitalism and Shari’a law could in fact 
compatible.113  Unfortunately for Sadr and other like-minded officials, the clergy gradually 
asserted its control of the government through the crafting of the constitution, which gave them 
ultimate control of the economy and other areas such as education, the media, and the legal 
system.114  The debates between the conservatives and reformists continued in the next decades 
and continue today.115    
 Elite political contestation grew significantly after the revolution and gradually became 
institutionalized within the structure of the government.116  The government increased the state 
bureaucracy by expanding existing ministries and other institutions such as the aforementioned 
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religious foundations, which are only accountable to the Supreme Leader.117  As a result, the 
Iranian government consists of a large array of government organizations.  Many of these 
institutions are extremely large (reaching up to hundreds of thousands of people), possess their 
own administrative structures and employees, and have created their own institutional cultures 
that further promote divisions with other institutions.118  These institutions are also places where 
politicians, technocrats and intellectuals can produce policy ideas and criticize the government or 
other institutions.  Importantly, because the government is so highly fragmented and has 
elections that occur regularly, these institutions are able to “regenerate” elites themselves.119  
Those elites that lose elections are not expelled but continue to work in the government either in 
the same organization or in other institutions.  This helps ensure that no one elite faction 
achieves dominance because elites cannot fully sideline and isolate opposing groups.   
 Along with elite factionalism, the Islamic authority codified in the constitution is another 
characteristic of the hybrid government and it is perhaps the most consequential and decisive 
factor that has enabled the Iranian regime to remain in power.  At all levels of the official 
government there are corresponding non-elected bodies comprised of clerics that have the 
authority to overrule policies of the former.  The clergy thus possessed and continue to hold the 
upper hand when it comes to policy-making.  The conflicts between the Majlis and the Guardian 
Council which, to reiterate, is required by the constitution to approve of the legislation produced 
by the Majlis, illustrates this well in the 1980s and then later in the 1990s and early 2000s.120   
                                                
117 For a detailed description about the enlargement of the government under the management of the Islamic 
Republic, see Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 168-178. 
118 Ibid. 
119 79. 
120 Disagreements between the two bodies emerged right immediately following the revolution. At issue was the 
struggle to reconcile legislation with Islamic law.  For example in 1981, the Council either vetoed or sent bills back 
to the parliament that addressed economic matters such as urban land ownership, mineral rights, land distribution, 
nationalization of foreign trade, and labor law.  The Council failed to approve many of these bills since they tended 
to infringe upon property rights, which were sacred according to Islamic law. (Behdad, 106; Arjomand, 31)  
  34 
 In 1989, the Iranian government passed a series of constitutional amendments that further 
solidified its rule.  It made the transition from an Islamic government based on Shi’a tradition, 
which stressed the “dualism of religious and political authority,” towards a more centralized 
theocratic state of “collective conciliar rule by clerical elite.”121  The Supreme Leader, of course, 
remained at the apex of this government and essentially came to possess the same power of a 
sultan or caliph and who would be to rule in order to serve the interest of the public.122  
Additionally, in order to finally end the constant legislative tussles between Majlis and the 
Guardian Council, Khomeini appointed a new regulatory body to the executive branch called the 
Expediency Council.  It is comprised of clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader, including the 
six clerical jurists of the Guardian Council, but also includes the president and the prime 
minister.  Its original purpose was to mediate and resolve the differences between the Guardian 
Council and the Majlis and not, as Khomeini wanted, become a third center of power and another 
group dominated by clergy.123   
 However, the Expediency Council became just that and more, eventually becoming a 
full-fledged legislative body that could directly shape government policies.  It did this by 
addressing and amending legislative bills that the Guardian Council and the Majlis did not 
disagree on; in 1993 the Guardian Council officially decreed that no legislative body could 
overrule decisions of the Expediency Council.  The combination of the Expediency and Guardian 
Councils and the increased power of the Supreme Leader relegated the Majlis to being primarily 
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a “consultative body with limited legislative authority.”124  Thus at the end of Khomeini’s life, 
clerical rule became institutionalized and secure. 
 The Islamic Republic further solidified its authority after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq 
War (1980-1988).125  Particularly in its early years, the war was crucial for the newly established 
regime.  Iranians, even those who disliked the regime, rallied around the government with 
nationalistic, patriotic fervor.126  The regime linked this sentiment with religion, thereby creating 
a nationalistic narrative to the revolution itself.  In other words, the war provided the regime with 
an opportunity to strengthen its power by linking Islam, which the regime used to justify its 
authority, with the potent upsurge of Iranian nationalism.127  The war was also a catalyst for state 
expansion in a wide range of areas.  For example, the government increased the size of the 
military, established new government ministries, censored the media, and promoted Islam in 
various forms.128  The regime’s coupling of religion and nationalism thus served as further 
justification for expanding and consolidating its power.  In this instance, a kind of “cultural 
religious-nationalism,” so to speak, functioned as an effective and powerful force that the regime 
could tap into to help strengthen its authority and inspire soldiers going into battle.   
 The war wreaked havoc upon the Iranian economy.  In the first half of the 1980s oil 
revenue was plentiful, amounting to roughly $75 billion in revenue.129  By the middle of the 
decade, however, the Iranian economy began to struggle and went into decline.  The war proved 
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costly both in lives and treasure, and oil prices fell in the middle of the decade down to $6 billion 
in 1986, which resulted in serious restrictions on the regime and the economy.130  Tax revenue 
fell, the economy contracted, the budget deficit rose, and consumer imports the population 
depended on declined. Poverty affected 65-70% of the population and the unemployment rate 
reached 15% by 1989.  There was not enough housing for the increasing population and the 
health care system suffered from a lack of resources for much of the healthcare workforce. 
(Amirahmadi, 293-394) 
 The conservative establishment, by then firmly in place, was able to not only withstand 
these economic challenges but was also able to enact economic reforms to address the problems 
described above while limiting and obstructing the implementation of liberal socio-political 
reforms.  The new pragmatist president elected in 1989, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and the 
newly appointed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khameini, quickly implemented liberal 
economic reforms to open up the economy, including the privatization of nationalized 
enterprises, the decontrolling of prices, and the elimination of subsidies.131  They also initiated 
first of several Five-Year Plans, a big part of which provided over twenty-five billion dollars in 
foreign investment132, opened five free trade zones, and reduced the size of the defense 
budget.133  Rafsanjani hoped these and other measures would lead to economic growth and 
ultimately a free-market system.134  Conservatives in the government, particularly conservative 
clerics, applauded and supported these economic policies.  In order to pass these reforms, 
Rafsanjani aligned himself with them, and, with the help of the Guardian Council which had the 
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authority to disqualify parliamentary candidates, was able to sideline leftists in the Majlis who 
advocated for strong government intervention in the economy.   
 However, gaining the support of the clerics and other conservatives came at a cost: it 
gradually forced Rafsanjani to essentially abandon his social and political reforms, which he 
considered essential for promoting economic development.  He did achieve some of these 
reforms, such as the expansion of higher education, the relaxation of restrictions on the press, 
music and film industry, the establishment of several women’s organizations, and the 
development of civil society.135  Beyond these however, the conservatives blocked his other 
socio-political reforms.  Furthermore, the Majlis as well as Khameini and the members of the 
Guardian Council also began to oppose Rafsanjani’s economic policies.  For example, 
Rafsanjani wanted to emulate China’s economic model of development.  This would have 
entailed changes such as reducing subsidies for food, fuel and gasoline; reducing financial 
support for and supervising of clerical economic foundations called bonyads136; privatizing 
nationalized companies; allowing increased foreign capital investment; and granting territorial 
concessions to foreign oil companies.137  According to the conservatives, these policies would 
have gone against revolutionary principles and values. 
 The election of reformist President Mohammad Khatami in 1997 proved to be a 
significant challenge to the conservative establishment.  He and other participants of the reform 
movement, as it became known, wanted to transform the Islamic Republic in a manner that 
would maintain its Islamic character while adopting democratic political and social reforms.  
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Reformists, a large majority of whom were young people, most notably young women, wanted 
political pluralism (the government banned the formation of political parties), economic growth 
and the development of civil society.  In short, they wanted to restructure the government—
Iran’s own perestroika.138  Specifically, the called for increased “personal freedoms, social 
justice, privacy, tolerance, public participation in the affairs of the state, consolidation of the rule 
of law, an open and free press, transparency in government, accountability and an end to 
corruption.”139  Khatami appeared to be the perfect leader of the movement since, as an educated 
and open-minded intellectual who studied Western thought and history, he embodied the 
democratic values held by the reformists.  His election signified a clear repudiation of Iranian 
authoritarianism and demonstrated that Iranians wanted change of the status quo and ultimately 
democracy.140 
 The reformists buttressed Khatami’s presidential win with victories in local elections in 
1999, the 2000 parliamentary elections, and reelecting him to a second term in 2001.  These 
victories, along with rising oil prices, enabled him to pursue the reformist agenda described 
above.  The government under Khatami allocated oil revenues to develop medical facilities, 
education, housing, infrastructure (electrical, water), and nuclear installations.141  As a result, 
literacy rates increased, mortality rates dropped significantly, and the percentage of female 
university and college students rose.  The Majlis passed over one-hundred reforms bills, many of 
which dealt with the judicial system.142  Additionally, Khatami also made efforts to improve the 
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image of Iran abroad, such as travelling to several countries, hosting a human rights conference, 
and even accepted a two-state solution in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
 Despite these gains, the constitutionally granted authority given to the clergy ultimately 
prevented the reform movement from breaking the authoritarian rule of the clerical 
establishment.  The clergy and their conservative allies employed a broad, long-term strategy in 
order to contain and counter the momentum towards reform; the reformists may have won 
elections but their agenda could be stymied in the future.143  The clergy’s control of the main 
government institutions, namely, the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, and the 
judiciary was their greatest strength.   
 Khatami’s presidency illustrates this point well.  In 1998, he appointed the Commission 
of the Implementation and Supervision of the Constitution.  Article 113 of the original draft of 
the Constitution grants the president the authority to safeguard and implement the constitution.  
The commission’s purpose was to advise Khatami on how to interpret article 113 in order to 
increase the power of the executive office and weaken the grip on to power possessed by the 
clerical establishment.  For example, Khatami attempted to challenge the Guardian Council’s 
authority to disqualify parliamentary candidates and shift the Council’s authority of supervising 
elections to the interior ministry.144  He also had the opportunity to confront the Judiciary.  
However, the clergy were too powerful and prevented Khatami from achieving these goals.145  
   The clergy and their conservative allies engaged in a variety of other legal or oftentimes 
violent and repressive strategies in order to stymie the reform movement.  In 1998, the 
conservatives orchestrated the impeachment of Adollah Nuri, the minister of the interior, one of 
Khatami’s most important reformist allies.  Nuri’s removal signaled to the conservatives that 
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they could be successful in their effort to counter the reformist agenda.146  The Guardian Council 
continued to veto the majority of reform bills passed in the Majlis and also increased their effort 
to disqualify parliamentary candidates.  In other instances the Council reviewed legislation that 
had little to do with adhering to Islamic principles such as in 2001 when the Expediency Council 
supported the Guardian Council’s rejection of the budget passed by the Majlis.147  In terms of 
repressive measures employed by the conservatives, the judiciary forced the closure of dozens of 
reformist-leaning newspapers and arrested intellectuals who criticized the regime or Islam or 
both.  The conservatives also used the muscle of the Revolutionary Guards148 and organized 
vigilante militias called the basij to tamp down anti-government organizing or protests, such as a 
protest gathering at Tehran University.149 
  Eventually, the pressure from the conservatives within the regime proved to be strong for 
reform movement.  This, and the fact that Khatami himself was, as many of his supporters 
complained, too passive and compromising in his leadership.150  As a result, Khatami lost much 
of his support, most of whom became disillusioned and apathetic with the reform movement and 
politics in general.  However, Khatami became president in a context in which unelected 
bodies—the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, and the judiciary—essentially dictated 
government policy-making, and in which the government’s ideological institutions and 
repressive security apparatuses all blocked the reform movement.151  
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 The failure of the reform movement coincided with a continuing faltering economy that 
was still dependent on oil revenues, and it led to conservative electoral victories between 2003 
and 2005, that latter being the election of the conservative-populist president Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad.  In the June 2009, presidential election aspirations for democratic reform rose 
once again.  Former prime minister (1981-1989) Mir Hussein Mousavi ran against Ahmadinejad 
as a reformist candidate.  Mousavi did not win but it was widely accepted that the election was 
rigged in favor of Ahmadinejad.  This sparked protests called the ‘green movement’, but the 
regime deployed the police and basij militias to violently suppress the movement, effectively 
eliminating the threat to the regime’s power.   
 This examination of Iran demonstrates that both external and particularly internal factors 
contributed to the persistence of authoritarianism in Iran.  This chapter therefore presents a more 
nuanced explanation as to why this has been the case rather than focusing on Iranian oil.  The 
Shah’s record as Iran’s monarch as perhaps the key factor that led to his demise and the 
emergence of the Islamic Republic and thus the continuation of authoritarianism in Iran.  Iraq’s 
invasion in 1980 was an immediate boost to the new regime.  The regime took advantage of the 
patriotic fervor that erupted and developed a nationalistic-religious narrative that it could use to 
legitimize and widen its authority.  The elite factionalism and the constitutionally granted 
authority of the clergy are also essential factors.  The former kept any aggregation of interests at 
bay that could challenge the clergy for power and the latter has prevented fundamental 
democratic reforms from taking place.  
 Oil revenues were and continue to be an integral component of the Iranian economy and 
an important source of revenue for the Islamic Republic.  They, however, cannot entirely account 
for the political context in Iran since the revolution in 1979.  As explored in this chapter, the 
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political structures of the Islamic Republic arose out of the complex social, political and 
economic context of the Pahlavi regime.  Once in place, the new government used different 
mechanisms and strategies to maintain its hold on to power.    
C. Enduring Authoritarianism in Iran and the ‘Arab Spring’     
 The Arab Spring, the ongoing (as of this writing, March 2012) revolutionary wave of 
protests in the Middle East that began in late December 2010, has witnessed protests calling for 
democratic reform across the region and the toppling of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Libya, 
and Egypt.  It remains to be seen whether those successful revolutions will result in the 
emergence of real democratic outcomes152 and the Arab Spring thus far has failed to make any 
kind of real dent in the Iranian regime, much less toppling it.  So, the important questions to 
explore at this stage are: what does the Arab Spring tell us about the persistence of 
authoritarianism in Iran, and, does the plentiful supply of oil revenue sufficiently explain the 
regime’s continued survival in the face of regional upheaval? 
 Despite the uprisings in 2009, the Iranian regime has stayed in power and been largely 
bypassed by the events of 2011.  On the surface, these facts would seem to validate the rentier 
state theory since Iran is an authoritarian oil-producing country.  However, the Islamic 
Republic’s continuing resilience has more to do with the evidence presented in this chapter than 
the argument of the rentier state theory.  To be sure, the Iranian government invests its oil 
revenues in various ways to help maintain its position in power, including funding a powerful 
security apparatus153 to clamp down on all anti-government protests.  It has been argued that 
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security apparatuses in the Middle East distinguish the region from other factors that contribute 
to the persistence of authoritarianism.154  In other words, authoritarian governments, like Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, remain in power because they employ their oil-funded security apparatuses to 
crush dissent.  However, oil alone cannot account for the persistence of authoritarianism in Iran.   
 The 2009 presidential election illustrates this point well but before discussing how, it is 
necessary to review the election itself.  As with the previous presidential campaigns since the late 
1990s, the 2009 election was about what kind of government ought to preside over Iran.  Once 
again, it pitted Islamists vs. reformists.  The election was about a fundamental choice between a 
continuation of Islamic authoritarian rule and the beginning of a truly democratic state.   
Ahmadinejad advocated for a continuation of his populist policies that benefitted the urban and 
rural poor as well as government workers.  The reformist candidate, Mousavi, campaigned, 
among other issues, for increased economic liberalization and less government control of the 
economy.  The middle and upper classes as well as large segments of the youth population were 
his main supporters.   
 Discontent with an authoritarian government was a major reason in galvanizing support 
for the opposition movement but socioeconomic factors, such as the decrease in oil prices, the 
global economic recession and high unemployment played a role as well.  The roots of the green 
movement however can be traced back to the previous one hundred years of Iranian 
constitutionalism.155  Iranians have demanded more representative governments on many 
occasions and it is this sentiment that led to the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy, the 
democratic reform movement in the late 1990s and most recently the 2009 protests.  The 
immediate cause of the 2009 protests after the election was the widespread belief among many  
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Iranians and foreign observers that the reelection of Ahmadinejad was fraudulent.156    
 Some of the same factors that account for authoritarianism in Iran discussed in this 
chapter help explain why the government withstood the election protests.  The Iranian 
government’s political structures is one crucial factor.  When one examines the political context 
of the election closely and the government structures of Iran, it is apparent that the 
constitutionally granted authority of the clergy places the conservatives in the government at a 
significant advantage.  If considered by itself, the successful government crackdown of the 
protests would add weight to the rentier state theory, since, as noted above, it asserts that regimes 
oil revenues contribute to the creation and maintenance of a security apparatus.  While this is 
certainly true, the fact is that ideas matter as well, and in this instance, a great deal.  The 
conservatives are at the helm of the government and they have support among key sectors of 
society precisely because of their religious and nationalist vision.  Additionally, controlling the 
government gives them the control of “key instruments of power”: the military, the state media, 
the judiciary and the aforementioned bonyads.157  They also, of course, control the NIOC158, 
which supplies the government with a key source of income.  All are powerful tools that provide 
the regime with a significant amount of control over society and enable it to withstand challenges 
to its authority.   
 Furthermore, the role of religion in the 2009 election and after is important, and reflects 
how revolutionary Shi’ism has helped sustain the current regime during the last three decades.  
As standard bearer and protector of Shi’a Islam, the Iranian government not only has had a 
significant constitutional advantage in controlling important institutions as well as in blocking 
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the previous reform efforts led by Khatami, it also has been able to generate significant amounts 
of political support among devout Muslims and urban and rural poor by promoting and 
advocating Islamic revolutionary principles and values.  Thus, the regime has been able to tap 
into the deeply entrenched cultural/religious reservoir of Iranian society to obtain support on 
various occasions.  As described earlier, this was important during the Iran-Iraq War.  It was also 
a significant factor during the Ahmadinejad’s election campaign in 2005 as well as in 2009.  In 
both elections, he promised to invest oil revenues into programs to fight poverty and promote 
social justice, two important elements of revolutionary ideology.  As a result, even if there were 
widespread electoral fraud during the 2009 election in his favor, Ahmadinejad still garnered a 
significant amount of support from a large swath of society, which gave his election and the 
regime legitimacy to rule in the eyes of many Iranians.   
 The factors described above explain why the Islamic Republic has been able to endure 
the Arab Spring, and, ultimately why authoritarianism persists in Iran.  Iran’s oil plays a major 
role in supporting the regime, but, on its own, is not a sufficient explanatory variable to really 
capture the country’s external and internal contexts.  The Iranian government is highly complex 
and fractured, with different interests vying for different aims.  Elite factionalism within the 
government, the prominence of religious belief and conservatism in Iranian society, and the fact 
that the clergy is at the apex of the government’s political structures, are some of Iran’s key 
features that have contributed to the regime’s survival.  They are also the same factors that, thus 
far, have stymied the Arab Spring from making a real impact in Iran.  Therefore it is inaccurate 
to assert that the Arab Spring has failed to bring about fundamental change to Iran simply 
because of oil.  There is simply more to the picture than this.  
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Chapter IV: The Case of Saudi Arabia 
A. Historical Overview 
 On the surface, the reason for the persistence of authoritarianism in Saudi Arabia is 
simple: it is ruled by an authoritarian government, a monarchy, and possesses abundant amounts 
of oil.  In fact, it is perhaps the best example of what a rentier state should look like.  To be sure, 
oil has had a tremendous impact on the Saudi state and society.  Yet, similar to the Iranian case, 
focusing on oil tends to exclude significant variables—the state’s political structures, the 
monarchy’s reemphasis of its Islamic character and that of the country in 1979, and the Saudi-
American relationship—that have contributed to the monarchy’s staying power.  Before delving 
into these areas, it is necessary to describe Saudi Arabia’s modern history in order to understand 
the context in which they will be explored.  
 Saudi Arabia was officially formalized in 1932 as constitutional monarchy.  However, as 
mentioned in Chapter II, its more accurate origination dates back to 1915 when the British and 
leader of the Al-Saud emirate Najd159, Abd al-Aziz al-Saud (more commonly known to 
foreigners as Ibn Saud), signed a pact.  Ibn Saud agreed to give up sovereignty rights for British 
protection from other emirates that also were vying for regional dominance.160  In return, the 
British supported his conquest of other emirates because they thought he would be a reliable 
client and this would expand the influence (and territory) of the British Empire.  As a result, 
Saudi Arabia effectively became a client state, dependent on Britain for protection, despite an 
earlier agreement (1927) recognizing Saudi Arabia’s independence.  
 The United States eventually replaced Britain as Saudi Arabia’s protector and 
guaranteeor of sovereignty.  ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company) discovered oil in 
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Saudi Arabia 1933 and began drilling two years later at Dhahran, a city located in the eastern 
portion of Saudi Arabia called the Eastern Province.  During WWII and afterwards oil proved to 
be a critical natural resource for the world’s economies and militaries.  For the United States, oil 
powered the American military and the American economy.  Securing its supply was thus 
critically important to U.S. economic and strategic interests.161  The United State’s sought to 
secure future access to Saudi oil by strengthening its ties with the Saudi Arabia.  It did this by 
various means such as building a military airfield at Dhahran in 1943, the use of which was 
important for the U.S. military during the Korean War in the 1950’s, and increased economic 
aid.  The ties between Saudi Arabia and the United States continued to be strong during the next 
several decades, even after ownership of ARAMCO gradually transitioned to the Saudi 
government.  The Saudi’s attained full control in 1988 and changed the name of the company to 
Saudi Aramco.   
 Foreign interest in oil was not the only consequential characteristic of Saudi Arabia’s 
history that shaped the country’s political structures, society and future.  According to Toby 
Jones (2010), the monarchy’s decision after WWII to gain control over the environment—water 
and land—was equally significant.  Being a mostly arid country, Saudi Arabia possesses little 
arable land, forcing the government to import food and water.  The only arable lands are those 
that surround oases, which were dispersed throughout the country.  However, the eastern portion 
of Saudi Arabia, the Eastern Province, contains an abundance of oases.  The al-Hasa and Qatif 
oases are the largest of these.   
 The monarchy recognized that control of the environment would enable it consolidate its 
political power and sustain its rule—whoever controlled the Eastern Province and its resources 
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would have the ability to control the people who depended on the life sustaining resources there.  
Accomplishing these objectives would ensure sources from which to collect taxes, ensure a 
supply of labor, safeguard national security, increase food production and establish control over 
people’s use of land.162  For example, the government constructed the al-Hasa Irrigation and 
Drainage Project (IDP) between 1964-1971 to irrigate lands containing two million date-palm 
trees.163  For various reasons, including a considerable decrease in water levels, the project failed 
to reach its goal of increasing the amount agricultural output, though it was a means through 
which the state firmly asserted itself in the region.  The project had an enormous impact on the 
socio-economic conditions in the al-Hasa oasis, the only area in the kingdom where Shi’a and 
Sunni Muslims lived together.  The IDP project and its ramifications are discussed further in the 
next section.  
 In addition to taming the environment, economic development, social growth, and 
modernization also concerned the monarchy.  It largely achieved these goals by the 1970s.  The 
monarchy established new government institutions such as the Ministry of Defense and Civil 
Aviation and Ministry of Interior, and increased the overall size of the state bureaucracy.164  It 
also invested state funds in industrialization, education, and in social services such as hospitals 
and social security.  By 1973, Saudi Arabia had become an interventionist state; a welfare state; a 
liberal state (in terms of favoring the merchant class in the traditional merchant towns located in 
the western province, the Hijaz, and ARAMCO’s operations in the Eastern Province); and an 
authoritarian state.165  Crucially, the business class and the states’ fiscal administration forged 
economic linkages with each other, creating networks through which the government collected 
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and managed information about the economy and thus properly redistribute resources throughout 
the country based on the information it gathered.166  In other words, the state learned how to 
regulate the economy efficiently.    
 However, the massive revenues Saudi Arabia received during the Oil Boom years 
resulted in the scaling back of sound economic regulation and the dismantling of decades of 
modernization.  Before the boom years in the 1960s, world crude oil prices were approximately 
$5 per barrel but by 1980 they reached to $40 per barrel (prices increased in 1973 as a result of 
the OPEC imposed Arab Oil Embargo, which was a reaction to the American support for Israel 
during the Yom Kippur War).167  During this period, Saudi Arabia accrued over one hundred 
billion dollars in oil revenues by 1980.  As a result, the state’s economic policy shifted from one 
of redistribution of taxes to one of distribution oil revenues in the form of real estate, industry, 
agriculture and social service subsidies.168  The discontinuation of the states’ economic 
regulatory capacity terminated the source of legitimacy (modernization) it had depended on for 
decades prior to the oil boom.169  The oil boom, then, augmented Saudi Arabia’s ‘rentier’ 
characteristics and, for many, solidified the perception of Saudi Arabia as simply a state whose 
authoritarian rule was and continues to be, based primarily on oil revenues.   
 The current state of the economy reflects this perception.  As stated earlier, the oil 
industry is by far the largest sector in the Saudi Arabian economy.  According to the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, as of 2010, Saudi Arabia is the largest producer and exporter of 
petroleum liquids in the world and possesses one-fifth of the world’s proven oil reserves.  Saudi 
Arabia’s GDP in 2010 was $434.6 billion and oil export revenues have generally amounted to 
                                                
166 107. 
167 United States Energy Information Administration: http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/index.cfm 
[accessed 12-29-11] 
168 Ibid. 
169 109. 
  50 
80-90% of Saudi revenues and 40-50% of GDP in recent years.170  The monarchy has initiated 
privatization measures in order to diversify the Saudi economy in areas such as 
telecommunications and natural gas and it is also developing nuclear power.  In light of this 
information, it is apparent that Saudi Arabia is heavily dependent on its oil reserves.  However, 
the next section will demonstrate that many factors contribute to the monarchy’s resilience. 
B. Regime Resilience: Mechanisms, Strategies and Political Structures of the Saudi State 
 By viewing Saudi Arabia as only an oil producing country, there is a tendency to 
overlook other important factors including its internal social, economic, and political conditions.  
The political structures of the Saudi monarchy is one such factor.  Examining these structures 
sheds light on the relationship between oil, politics and society in Saudi Arabia and complicates 
two important claims of the rentier state theory—namely, that oil revenues alone shape political 
structures, and that governments dependent on oil revenues (or other ‘rent’ income) are to a large 
degree autonomous from society.  According to Herb (1999), the Saudi state has survived 
because it is a ‘dynastic monarchy,’ of which there are several in the Gulf region including Qatar 
and Kuwait.  Herb defines a dynastic monarchy as a government ruled by a royal family, whose 
members occupy senior government positions, such as those in ministries and cabinets, as well as 
lower level leadership positions throughout the government.   
 Family consensus decides the succession of rule in dynastic monarchies.  This consensus-
making process entails a large amount of bargaining.171  The king retains and ensures his 
authority by securing the support of certain family members, specifically sheiks and princes, in 
return for appointments in senior bureaucratic posts in the state, such as in the aforementioned 
ministries and cabinets.  High-ranking family members bargain with the aspiring ruler for these 
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positions and in return they support him.  The amount and extent of bargaining within the family 
increased significantly when the size of state grew after the discovery of oil, as family members 
vied for leadership posts in the new state institutions.   
 The distribution of these and other government positions of authority to members of the 
royal family, as well as the succession of rule process, are essential mechanisms that have 
enabled the Saudi monarchy to maintain its hold on to power.172  Limiting these positions to the 
family ensures that the family retains control of the state bureaucracy.  These procedures also 
restrict policy or succession of rule disagreements to within the family and prevent internal 
fracturing which may threaten the ruler’s authority and that of the monarchy itself.173  The family 
discusses and resolves any problems or issues without the interference of those outside it who 
may want to challenge its absolute rule.  All of these factors guarantee that the royal family 
maintains control of Saudi Arabia.   
 Furthermore, it is essential to state here that these political conditions—a dynastic 
monarchy where positions of authority are allotted to family members and where the family 
adheres to a strict hierarchy—existed before the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia and have 
remained in tact ever since.  Saudi culture, therefore, shaped the structures of the Saudi 
monarchy rather than oil wealth.  Additionally, as the size of the government grew, oil wealth 
gave elite family members significant leeway in creating bureaucracies according to their 
interests and wishes.  Moreover, while oil gave them the freedom to make political decisions 
about the structure and operations of new state agencies and organizations, it did not 
“predetermine” these choices but instead furthered choices that were made for other reasons.174    
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    All of this is not to suggest that oil did not have any effect on the development of Saudi 
Arabia’s political structures.  Clearly, oil revenues funded the expansion of the state bureaucracy 
both in terms of the number of government institutions and public sector jobs.  However, oil 
wealth did not determine what these structures and various institutions would look like.  Rather, 
elite royal family members made these decisions.  Over time, they created a type of government 
what Hertog (2010) calls a “hierarchical, vertically divided hub-and-spoke system,” in which 
there are three levels: the macro, meso, and micro levels.175  The king and senior family 
members comprise the macro-level, i.e., the ‘hub’; the ‘spokes’ are the state agencies and 
organizations that comprise the meso-level; and the smaller “individual organizational units and 
bureaucrats” located within meso-level organizations that constitute the micro-level.  Many links 
between state and society exist at the micro-level, as “small-scale personalized networks” 
between micro-level employees and members of society facilitate the dispersing state 
resources.176  
 According to Hertog, even though these political structures are organized in a ‘top-down’ 
fashion (where the leadership at the macro-level decides what national policies to pursue), they 
are quite fragmented; the state has both efficient and inefficient parts.  For example, 
fragmentation occurs when political elites increase the number of institutions to the government 
during oil surpluses.177  These additional organizations increase the size of an already large state 
bureaucracy, which by its nature is already inefficient.  On the other hand, some “islands of 
efficiency” exist within the government, primarily ministries such as the Saudi Arabian 
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Monetary Agency (SAMA), and are led by technocrats that specialize in certain areas.178  The 
main characteristic of all of these agencies is the fact that they answer only to the macro-level of 
the government.  
 This description of Saudi political structures is important because although oil has had a 
tremendous impact on Saudia Arabia, both Herb and Hertog make clear that al-Saud family 
members shaped what Saudi political structures looked like more so than any other factor.  As 
Hertog states, “there is no automatic mechanism that produces corruption, rent-seeking, and a 
weak bureaucracy.”179  The family retained its pre-oil political structures and placed its members 
in leadership positions throughout the government after oil revenues funded the expansion of the 
bureaucracy.  Furthermore, the authors demonstrate that even though oil wealth has provided the 
monarchy with a high level of autonomy, there are no distinct boundaries between it and Saudi 
society.  In other words, similar to what Jessop and Mitchell discussed in Chapter II, Saudi 
Arabia’s state and society boundaries overlap.  Saudi society does in fact have the capacity to 
affect the state in significant ways, something for which the rentier state theory does not account.   
 The implementation of government policy similarly illustrates this point.  When leaders 
in the macro-level order a policy to be implemented, it typically gets bogged down and reshaped 
in the meso and micro-levels of the government.180  On the meso-level, state agencies, because 
there are so many of them, have the ability to “veto” certain parts of policies.181  The same 
essentially occurs on the micro-level.  Administrators at these levels often delay the 
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implementation of or interpret policies in different ways.  Thus the meso and micro-levels make 
it difficult for the government to enact many of its policies.   
 Hertog discusses the government policy project of increasing the numbers of Saudis in 
the private sector, called “Saudization”, as an example of this.182  Saudization highlights the 
overlapping boundaries of the state and society and challenges the claim of the rentier state 
theory that the former is autonomous from the latter.  The oil boom in the 1970s attracted large 
numbers of foreign private sector workers to Saudi Arabia and their numbers soon exceeded that 
of Saudi workers.  This trend continued in the 1980s, 1990s and persists today.  The public sector 
could not afford to expand indefinitely to accommodate for the steadily increasing number of 
Saudi graduates looking for work.  Additionally, the number of available private sector jobs was 
(and still is) much lower than that of government jobs, and they typically offered lower wages as 
well so there was little incentive for Saudis to earn business degrees.  As a result of these factors, 
among others, the economic and political climate of the kingdom was vulnerable to instability.183  
Saudi rulers recognized that the only way to Saudiize the private sector, as well as increase its 
size, was through various government regulations.  Ultimately, the monarchy understood that 
economic growth could only come from the private sector. 
 Regulations came in the form of several government decrees, the first of which, Decree 
50, was issued in 1995.  It mandated that all businesses increase the number of Saudi employees 
by five percent every year.184  Subsequent decrees mandated similar requirements.  Other 
regulations included raising the fees for work and residency permits for foreign workers in order 
to encourage businesses to hire Saudi nationals.  However, the fragmented structures of the 
government discussed above prevented the proper implementation and enforcement of 
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Saudization.  Several factors, including confusing and inconsistent rules, the sheer size of 
government agencies, the interplay of the micro, meso and macro levels within them, and 
informal networks between state employees and society that bypass regulations, have given 
lower levels of government the ability to ‘veto’ certain parts of Saudization and other state 
policies.   
 In addition to its political structures, the monarchy has employed a number of strategies 
in order to reinforce its rule.  The state’s reemphasis of its Islamic character in 1979 in response 
to Islamic uprisings (described below) in the Muslim holy city of Mecca and the Eastern 
Province was one such strategy.185  The unrest of the latter will be discussed here.  The strategy 
is directly related to the discussion earlier in this chapter about the monarchy’s aim to control the 
environment in the Eastern Province—oil and water—in order to gain legitimacy domestically 
and abroad and to increase its power.  The upswell in Islamic radicalism and opposition forced 
the Saudi state in the 1980s and beyond to reemphasize its Wahabi indentity in order to 
counteract the Islamic ideology espoused by the radical Shiites in the Eastern Province as well as 
the radical Sunnis in Mecca.  Ultimately, the strategy was a political decision to help the 
monarchy stave off Islamic dissent and justify its rule.  In terms of this thesis, it serves as an 
alternative example to the argument (of the rentier state theory) that oil  that rent income, in the 
form of oil revenues, is the primary reason for the persistence of authoritarian in Saudi Arabia.  
The strategy also demonstrates, how different factors can shape government policy.186  In Saudi 
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Arabia, the monarchy’s reemphasis of Islam was the result of poor policy-making rather than a 
strategy prompted by oil wealth.  
  The origins of the unrest in the Eastern Province stemmed from the government’s refusal 
to acknowledge the “socioreligious and hierarchical system” in the al-Hasa oasis from the 1950s 
onward.187  As mentioned earlier, the oasis was home to a mixed population of Sunnis and 
Shiites who lived either in the area’s cities or villages.  In the cities, Sunnis mostly constituted 
the upper class (earning a living as traders) and the majority of Shiites were craftsmen.  In the 
villages, Shiites comprised the lower classes (craftsmen, agricultural laborers and small farmers) 
and Sunnis comprised the upper class (large landowners).  The relationship between the Sunnis 
and Shiites in cities and the villages was neutral at best.  However, the relationship between the 
Shiite population and the Sunni monarchy had always been acrimonious because of religious 
differences.  As adherers of Wahhabism, an anti-Shiite branch of Islam, the monarchy’s rulers 
viewed the Shiites in al-Hasa with disdain and repeatedly ignored their presence.188     
 This trend continued during and after the completion of the IDP project in 1971.  The 
project, though promising at first, depleted water levels which in turn decreased the amount of 
land available for cultivation and in the end, the project thus failed to significantly increase 
agricultural output.  Large landowners, most of whom were Sunni, were able to survive because 
they owned the larger tracts of land.  Smaller Shiite farmers could no longer continue working as 
farmers and were forced to move to urban areas or work as agricultural laborers for the 
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landowners.  Thus far from benefitting the entire population of the oasis, the project reinforced 
the hierarchical social structure described in Vidal’s report.189   
 The IDP project was part of the government’s overall modernization efforts.  The 
government declared in 1962 that it would pursue development aims of controlling and 
maximizing the use of natural resources, creating self-sufficient agriculture, and investing in 
industry and infrastructure.  The Shiites living in the Eastern Province, however, saw very little 
of this development and continued to experience not only discrimination but they also suffered 
from poor living conditions (water pollution, disease, old water and sewage infrastructure).  The 
situation was the opposite in cities in the province, Damman, Dhahran and al-Khobar, which had 
greatly benefited from government development.  As a result, decades of uneven development 
socially and politically marginalized small coastal towns and villages that used to be centers of 
commerce and a vibrant cultural life.190  Alienated Shiite residents expressed their frustration in 
local newspapers but the government rejected and suppressed their concerns. 
 Thus in effect, by ignoring the Shiite’s grievances for decades, the monarchy allowed 
opposition to accumulate to a breaking point where some of them turned to Shi’a Islam “as a 
framework within which to express political dissent.”191  This frustration manifested itself in the 
November 1979 protests.192  The decades of social, political and economic marginalization, 
proved to be too much to bear for the Shiites in the Eastern Province.  The accumulation of all of 
these factors resulted in a major political shift in the province in the late 1970s: the formation of 
a radical Shi’a Islamist movement that was frustrated with their subservient living conditions and 
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infused with ideological fervor against the government.193   It is important note here that the 
January 1979 Iranian Revolution, in which Shi’a Islam served as its ideological base, 
significantly influenced and energized the Shi’a Muslims in the Eastern Province, though it did 
not directly lead to the uprising there.194  The Islamic Republic wanted to assert and increase its 
influence in the region.  For example, it actively supported the Shi’a uprising in the Eastern 
Province in order to try to undermine Saudi Arabia from within.195 
 The monarchy recognized how vulnerable it was after the protest and that it needed to 
reinforce its Islamic credentials in order to undermine the strength of the Islamic opposition.196  
Specifically, it enhanced the power of religious authorities, increased the emphasis of Islam in 
the education, suppressed anti-Islamic behavior, and bolstered the image of Saudi Arabia as an 
Islamic state to the rest of the world.197  The monarchy also increased the authority of the 
religious police, who enforced strict adherence to Wahhabi codes of social behavior, and built 
new religious schools (madrasas) and universities that promoted the study of Islam.198  The result 
was a government in the 1980s that based its legitimacy not on modernization, development, 
science and expertise, but rather, to one that based its authority on Islam; it essentially renewed 
Saudi Arabia’s national identity back to Islam.199    
 In addition to emphasizing its Islamic identity and promoting Islam in the kingdom, in 
the 1980s and beyond, the Saudi government also strengthened its ties with the United States.  
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By protecting the monarchy, the United States has, in effect, actively supported authoritarianism 
in Saudi Arabia.  The theory does not acknowledge this fact or the significantly consequential 
role it plays.  As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the economic, political and military 
relationships between the United States and Saudi Arabia were already well established and 
continued to serve the interests of both countries.  By 1980, the United States was the biggest 
investor in the Saudi oil industry and sold the most arms to the kingdom.  Saudi Arabia, in turn, 
eventually “became the largest investor in American banks, treasury bonds and real estate.”200 
 These linkages, however, reveal a crucial fact about the Saudi Arabia: it has an 
authoritarian system of government but a weak and fragmented military despite the enormous 
sums of money invested in it.  The vast amounts of oil wealth at monarchy’s disposal would 
predict an authoritarian regime as well as a strong military to support the government, but this is 
not the case in Saudi Arabia.  Saudi Arabia developed strong military ties with the United States 
to ensure the external security that a military would typically provide.  In other words, American 
military protection has effectively taken the place of a strong Saudi military.   
 According to Ayubi (1995), this situation is due to Saudi Arabia’s internal security 
conditions.  The fear of a military takeover of the government, which almost occurred on several 
occasions between the 1950s and 1970s, prevents the monarchy from creating a robust armed 
forces.  To ameliorate threats originating from the military, the monarchy has resorted to various 
measures, including providing senior officers with financial and material rewards, balancing 
different military branches off each other, assigning top military posts to officer-princes, 
increasing wages, and improving living and training conditions.201  Ultimately, the monarchy has 
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essentially created a decentralized military, one that is unlikely to attempt a coup.  The United 
States, too, did not fully advocate for the development of a strong Saudi military because, as 
Ayubi states, it feared a military coup just as much as they did any external threat to the 
kingdom.  Maintaining regional stability was and continues to be America’s upmost concern and 
protecting Saudi Arabia, even if that meant supporting an authoritarian government, was a key 
component of those efforts.   
 This was important throughout much of Saudi Arabia’s history but the monarchy 
strengthened its relationship with the United States even more during and after the 1980s.  Both 
countries shared mutual interests during several geopolitical events over this period: the fall of 
the Shah in Iran in 1979202, the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in October of 1979203, the Iran-
Iraq War (1980-1988)204, the first Gulf War (August 1990-February 1991)205, the rise of radical 
Islamic terrorism in the 1990s206, and Iran’s current rise as a major regional player in the 
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aftermath at the end of the Second Gulf War (2003-2011)207.  Discussing each of these in detail 
would be far too long for this thesis, however each illustrates the extent to which both Saudi 
Arabia and the United States have shared strategic interests.   
 Thus far, it has been a mutually beneficial partnership, something that does not conform 
to the rentier state theory, which argues that Saudi Arabian’s oil wealth keeps the monarchy in 
power.  The legacy of American interests and involvement in Saudi Arabia described by Robert 
Vitalis remains to this day.  Saudi Arabia still depends on the United States for protection and 
continues to purchase American weaponry.  The economic ties have remained strong as well.  
Saudi Arabia sends a large portion of its exports to the United States, American companies invest 
the most in Saudi Arabia, and the United States relies on the Saudis to keep other OPEC 
members from increasing oil prices.208  These and other ties have clearly benefited both 
countries, but perhaps more so for Saudi Arabia in terms of its survival.  Without American 
support, in its various forms, the Saudi monarchy may not have survived this long.   
 Saudi Arabia’s social policies have been crucial for its survival as well.  This is 
predicated by the rentier state theory, which argues that social spending of rent income tends to 
create largely acquiescent societies.  Indeed, government expenditures on society have 
undoubtedly been a central feature of Saudi Arabia’s history post-WWII and an important 
government strategy to remain in power.  Saudi Arabia’s enormous oil revenues (oil revenues 
increased from approximately $110 billion dollars in 1951 to 47.5 billion dollars in 1992; after 
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1973 revenues increased exponentially then leveled off when the boom ended in the 1980s209) 
enabled it to fund social service and infrastructure projects, such as the IDP project, throughout 
society in order to ensure that Saudi citizens, at least the majority of the population and 
especially elites with connections to the state, could benefit from the wealth generated by the oil 
industry. 
 The Saudi government did not provide social services to the population and invest in 
infrastructure projects simply for altruistic purposes.  In other words, it is not enough for an 
authoritarian government’s survival to only distribute oil revenues to society.  In Saudi Arabia’s 
case, in addition to its political structures and ties with the United States, the monarchy has 
employed a specific strategy what Hertog calls “cooptation.”210  Hertog defines cooptation as the 
process by which the Saudi government, as its bureaucracy increased in size, coopted virtually 
every part of society.  Before and after the 1950s, the monarchy allocated oil revenues towards 
itself, the military, the police, and towards tribes and religious organizations in the form of state 
subsidies.211  As the Saudi government grew in size thanks to the ever-increasing oil revenues, it 
expanded its reach into and “reshape[d] significant parts of society.”212  In other words, the 
government progressively penetrated and brought society under its jurisdiction as it established 
new ministries and other state institutions.  Solidifying state power was the ultimate objective of 
cooptation.   
 Cooptation directly reflects of the political structures of the government itself, described 
earlier as a hierarchical, “hub and spoke” system of highly fragmented parts.  The continuous 
flow of oil revenues, particularly during the oil boom years, and the royal family’s complete 
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control of the expansion of the government, increased the size of the state in a rather disorderly 
manner.  Government officials and those individuals with connections to the state called 
“brokers” created numerous networks within the state that bridged the gap between the rigid, 
hierarchical state political structures and society.213  Brokers serve as intermediaries between the 
state and society (specifically, individuals or groups of individuals) and their service is 
effectively the only means through which Saudis can gain access to state resources.  
Additionally, brokers have very specific functions and ties to certain areas in the state.  Thus 
individuals attain access to state resources primarily from the local, micro-level, not through the 
larger government institutions.214   
 Through the mechanism of bureaucratic cooptation, the Saudi state brought society 
increasingly under its guidance and control in several ways.  Employment in the public sector 
was one such approach.  The number of government employees rose as the size of the 
government grew.  Between 1970 and 1980, the government established ten new ministries in 
addition to twenty new government agencies.215  Accordingly, the government hired over 
300,000 public sector employees, increasing the number from 120,000 in 1970.  Expanding 
social services was another method the government used.  During the 1970s and beyond, 
government social expenditures reached virtually every part of Saudi society except in the 
Eastern Province.  The government increased investments in health care, education and 
housing.216  By the 1990s, the government built over 250 new hospitals, hundreds of health 
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clinics around the country, and raised the number of doctors and medical personnel to over 
seventy thousand people.217  Expanding education was particularly important.  The government 
wanted graduates with technical degrees in order to proceed with its modernization efforts.  The 
education system in Saudi Arabia was rather small compared to other Arab countries in the 
1950s but by the early 1970s, the government spent one billion dollars to expand it.  The 
government hired thousands of foreign teachers and founded several teacher-training colleges.  
Religious colleges, universities and institutes were opened, including the secular Riyadh 
University.  Hundreds of thousands of boys and girls were enrolled in schools (the number of 
boys outnumbered that of girls and they were taught separately) and thousands of undergraduate 
and graduate students were enrolled in colleges and universities.  After graduation, they found 
employment almost entirely in the public sector.218  By the 1990s, seven universities had been 
established as well as a number of engineering colleges.  Finally, in terms of housing, the 
government built approximately 2.5 million housing units by the 1990s. (Vassiliev, 433-434)   
 The Saudi government was mostly or almost entirely autonomous from society thereby 
during the 1950s and 1960s,, an outcome predicted by the rentier state theory, as the royal family 
took it upon itself to make political and social decisions without outside input, even from the key 
social groups of merchants, tribes or Muslim religious leaders (ulama).219  However, this chapter 
has described the growth of the Saudi state over time and its relations with society, the process of 
which increased the connections and linkages between them.  The state incurred increasing levels 
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of obligations towards society and was unwilling to retract these commitments.220  Therefore, not 
only did the state-society boundaries overlap, as argued by Jessop and Mitchell in Chapter II, 
society came to hold the state accountable through the state’s obligations to its people.  This 
accountability demonstrates that Saudi Arabia’s state and society are indeed not distinct entities; 
numerous connections exist between them.  Furthermore, the variety and large number of 
government institutions, social networks and hierarchies kept “society fragmented and dependent 
upon the state.”221  In effect, every part of society, from elites to Saudi citizens, became “clients” 
of the state through public sector employment, social services and specific government agencies 
(via brokers).  As a result of this heterogeneity of the government, there was little possibility for 
the aggregation of interests among different parts of society.222  Thus collective opposition and 
the demand for fundamental political change to the government has yet never materialized in 
Saudi Arabia.223  Therefore, Saudi authoritarianism relies upon a complex web of cultural, social 
and political factors rather than dependence on oil revenues. 
 The strategies and mechanisms outlined in this chapter also account for the lack of 
political change and the monarchy’s long-term survival.  Emphasizing its Islamic identity was 
the monarchy’s response to counteract the Shiite uprising and its powerful and arguably justified 
anger at the government.  Decades of cooptation by widening the government’s reach into 
society helped consolidate the royal family’s rule.  Oil income funded this expansion as well as 
other modernization projects, including the IDP project.  As essential as oil has been for Saudi 
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Arabia, however, it did not predetermine the choices the government made in expanding the state 
or decisions it made to stay in power. 
C. Enduring Authoritarianism in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring 
 Notwithstanding the protests throughout the Middle East in early 2011, the Arab Spring 
did not alter Saudi Arabia’s political structures.  The monarchy undoubtedly used its oil revenues 
to keep discontent at a minimum, but there is more to the picture than this.  To be clear, the 
monarchy remains firmly in control and there is no sign that it is in any danger of collapsing.  
Like the Iranian case, this resilience would appear to validate the rentier state theory, given the 
fact that Saudi Arabia possesses the world’s largest oil reserves in the world and is thus 
considered the quintessential rentier state.  As shown in this chapter, oil wealth has indeed 
provided Saudi Arabia with the financial resources to modernize and provide numerous kinds of 
benefits for its people.  The monarchy used this tactic on February 23rd, 2011, when King 
Abdullah announced a $37 billion aid package that would be distributed among Saudi citizens in 
the form of pay raises, unemployment benefits, affordable family housing and others.224  This 
action taken by the government is a clear case of rentierism at work.  Yet the evidence presented 
in the preceding pages points to other, more consequential factors that have enabled the 
monarchy to prevent any internal dissent during the Arab Spring, not least of which, the 
American-Saudi partnership. 
 The ongoing Arab Spring protests in Saudi Arabia’s small Persian Gulf neighbor, 
Bahrain, demonstrate this clearly.  They are important not only because they aim to bring about 
democratic reform to the kingdom, they highlight the significant role the American-Saudi 
relationship plays in Middle East politics in blocking the emergence of democracy in the region 
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as a whole for the sake of regional stability.  This relationship is perhaps the most decisive factor 
that challenges the notion that Saudi Arabia has withstood, internally, the powerful wave of Arab 
Spring protests because of its oil wealth.   
 Though not directly affected by the Arab Spring within its borders, Saudi Arabia has 
several reasons to be wary of it, especially in Bahrain.  As an authoritarian country, Saudi Arabia 
is fearful of any external democratic impulses in the Middle East because such influences would 
have the potential to foment domestic dissent.  Saudi Arabia had already experienced this kind of 
turmoil in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution when the Shiites in the Eastern Province rose 
up against the government.  As a result, the monarchy has been mindful of the Arab Spring 
because its calls for democratic reforms and political pluralism directly challenge the monarchy’s 
power as well as the regional stability of the Persian Gulf in general.   
 Such a challenge arose when Arab Spring protests began in February 2011 in Bahrain.  
Bahrain consists of a majority Shi’a population that is ruled by the Sunni, al-Khalifa monarchy.  
The monarchy rules with a firm, often repressive grip over the Shi’a population.225  They are 
essentially an alienated population and receive few of the benefits of Bahrain’s oil wealth.  
Emulating the other protests in the Middle East, the Shi’a called for a parliament that was 
actually representative of the entire population and, because unemployment is high among them, 
demanded more job opportunities in the government and lucrative economic sector.226  The 
situation escalated on March 14th when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates agreed to 
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deploy security 1,500 forces to help suppress the protests.227  The security forces immediately 
began a violent and bloody crackdown (protests are still occurring at the time of this writing). 
 The stability of Bahrain is very important for both the United States and Saudi Arabia.  
For the United States, Bahrain is a vital component of the United States’ geostrategic policy in 
the Middle East.  It is the location of the United States Naval Forces Central Command and 
home to the U.S. Fifth Naval Fleet.  The United States worries that any kind of instability would 
disrupt the flow of oil coming from the Persian Gulf and threaten its allies there, particularly 
Saudi Arabia.  There is also a perception in the United States and in Saudi Arabia that Iran is 
supporting the Shi’a protesters in Bahrain.228  If true, this would pose a significant problem 
because Iran and Saudi Arabia have been regional political and ideological rivals (Iran is a Shi’a 
majority country and Saudi Arabia is a Sunni majority country) since the Iranian Revolution in 
1979.  The United States and Iran have been at odds for most of the time ever since.  The Arab 
Spring protests in Bahrain added new urgency to protecting Saudi Arabia from Iran and any 
other threats.229 
 Saudi Arabia’s concerns with Bahrain are essentially the same as that of the United 
States.  Ensuring the subservience of the Shi’a population in Bahrain Saudi Arabia has been an 
essential part of Saudi Arabia’s strategy to protect itself from any internal dissent that threatens 
its security.  The Saudi monarchy has a significant amount of leverage over the al-Khalifa 
monarchy principally because Bahrain does not have as much oil as other gulf states so it relies 
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on Saudi Arabia to provide it with hundreds of millions of dollars each year.230  According to 
Herb, this is a key reason why Bahrain did not open a new parliament for so long.  As essentially 
its benefactor, Saudi Arabia has not wanted Bahrain to do so for fear of giving the Shi’a 
population a space to express their demands upon the government.  This, inevitably, would 
decrease some of the monarchy’s power and would perhaps threaten its very authority.  
Additionally, like the United States, the Saudi government fears that increased Shi’a 
representation in the government would invite the influence and interference of Iran in Bahraini 
affairs, which has in fact occurred in the past.231  Thus, for all of the reasons described above, 
when Arab Spring protests began in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia knew that it needed to act.  The 
United States agreed with this as well.  Although it has condemned the level of violence and 
brutality of the crackdown, it has not pressured the government to change policies.  By doing 
this, the United States essentially acknowledged the double standard it has applied to other Arab 
Spring protests.232  For example it, along with other NATO member states, provided military 
support of the overthrow of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi but effectively gave the green 
light to the Saudis to send the security forces into Bahrain. 
 The above examination of the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain, and their implications for 
the region, demonstrate that the persistence of authoritarianism in Saudi Arabia during the Arab 
Spring is a result of one of the important pieces of evidence put forward in this chapter—the 
longstanding American-Saudi relationship.  While the United States cannot outright dictate to 
Saudi Arabia about what its internal and external policies ought to be, for over half of a century, 
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with intermittent and sometimes serious disagreements such as during the 1973 Oil Crisis, their 
partnership has been mutually beneficial.  The United States government, along with other 
Western governments, want to ensure that the global oil market remains secure and stable.  The 
Saudi monarchy, in turn, wants the continued American protection and to remain in power.  
Therefore, while oil is certainly a crucial underlying factor in this discussion, the failure of the 
Arab Spring to cause fundamental political change in Saudi Arabia has more to do with the 
kingdom’s ties with the United States than its oil wealth.  Oil revenue has certainly enabled the 
monarchy to stave off opposition and is an important reason why the monarchy has survived, but 
it is only one component of the story of enduring authoritarianism in Saudi Arabia. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
 This thesis has presented a more nuanced examination of the persistence of 
authoritarianism in the Middle East than the rentier state theory can account for.  In each case 
study, both internal and external contexts were examined and it was found that certain factors 
have played a significant consequential role in determining what the current political (as well as 
social and economic) situation is in each country.  The Iranian and Saudi regimes have used 
different mechanisms and strategies to maintain their position in power.  Oil revenues were and 
continue to be a major source of income that supports the regimes, but oil in itself does not 
predetermine the decisions made by political leaders.  Oil, for example, is not the dominant force 
within the political structures of the Islamic Republic nor does it have any bearing on the extent 
to which Islam is embedded within Iranian society.  Likewise in Saudi Arabia, while oil revenues 
funded the expansion of the monarchy, they do not account for the pre-monarchy tribal structures 
that remained in place after the kingdom’s founding or predetermine what newly established 
state institutions would look like.  Nor do oil revenues account for the strategies the monarchy 
has employed to ensure its survival.  Lastly, the Cold War context played a significant and 
consequential role in shaping internal events in both countries.  
 At its core, the rentier state theory makes an important assumption about the relationship 
between state and society.  The theory assumes that it can explain whether a government will be 
either democratic or authoritarian and, accordingly, how each type of government will behave, 
based on this relationship.  In non-rentier states, the government bargains with its citizens about 
the amount of taxes it imposes on them in exchange for representation in the government.  In this 
way, citizens are able to hold their government accountable.  The end result of this process is a 
democratic government (though, to be sure, not all non-rentier states are democratic).  On the 
other hand, in rentier states, given the fact that these governments control the resources 
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independently of society, governments do not need to make such an accommodations with their 
citizens because rent preclude the need for taxes and thus the need for negotiation.  Moreover, 
the regime distributes some of this income to key constituencies.  For both of these reasons, this 
frees the government from sharing political power with society and it becomes powerful and 
authoritarian as a result.  In other words, the rentier aspect of the economy provides the 
government with increased political power.  Rentier states ensure support by distributing rent 
income throughout society, usually in the form of social services.  Furthermore, the rentier state 
theory is premised on the notion of exceptionalism—the notion that Middle Eastern culture is 
incompatible with democracy.  However, rather than focusing on culture, the theory argues that 
the region’s economics make it exceptional.  Thus proponents of the rentier state theory view the 
region as an economic anomaly, an ‘other’, similar to those who still view Middle Eastern 
culture in the same manner.   
 In contrast, this thesis has provided a more sound theoretical framework through which to 
investigate authoritarianism in the Middle East.  The framework looks at the cases of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia in a wholistic manner.  For example, in terms of the belief in Middle Eastern 
exceptionalism, in both cultural and economic terms, this approach reveals why exceptionalism 
is a flawed concept.  The acceptance of this notion overrides the possibility that authoritarianism 
stems from other factors: the history, external contexts or, in particular, internal social, economic 
and political conditions—like those explored in the preceding chapters—of authoritarian 
countries in the Middle East.   
 Furthermore, as the cases illustrate, a wholistic understanding of the state-society 
relationship will take into account the fact that state and society are not two separate entities but 
rather overlap each other.  The Iranian and Saudi Arabian cases uphold the view that the state 
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can rarely act independently of its people, with or without a representative body.  In Iran, the 
state formation process that took place during and after the Iranian Revolution emerged out of 
the complex socio-economic and repressive context of the Pahlavi regime.  The Shah’s 
modernization policies, while providing many benefits, also led to unintended consequences, 
failed to reach the expectations of the public and alienated many Iranians, perhaps the most 
important of whom were the clergy.  This societal context before the revolution thus had a 
tremendous impact on the structure of the Islamic Republic.  Though the new government 
retained much of the previous state, it repudiated the Pahlavi monarchical rule.  Furthermore, in 
terms of Saudi Arabia, the state may appear to be autonomous from its society but, as described 
in Chapter IV, Saudi society influences the outcome and implementation of state policies.  
Additionally, the responsibility of the Saudi state to provide Saudis with social services, 
infrastructure projects and other benefits, is another example that state-society boundaries 
overlap.    
 Iran and Saudi Arabia’s historical record also challenges many of the assumptions of the 
rentier state theory.  One is that oil alone is the primary factor that has maintained the 
governments in both countries to remain in power but the historical record counters this 
assumption.  Up until the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the United States and Britain had a stake in 
ensuring that Iran remained a stable, reliable ally during the Cold War.  The fact that they 
restored the Shah’s rule in the 1953 coup and continued to support his regime exemplifies this.233  
Another assumption is that rentier regimes and their leaders should not fall from power but the 
Shah was, in fact, overthrown.  In terms of Saudi Arabia, foreign involvement was a similarly an 
important feature of its history.  From Saudi Arabia’s establishment, to its decision to gain 
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control the environment (which required significant levels of foreign expertise) in order to 
consolidate of power, and to its continual strengthening of ties with the United States in the 
decades following World War II, Saudi Arabia, like Iran, cannot be studied in isolation.  The 
development of the oil industry, in which the United States played such a crucial role, 
particularly epitomizes this assertion.  Certain historical events and circumstances contributed to 
authoritarian regime durability in both countries. 
 The alternative paradigm offered in this thesis also accounts for the various mechanisms, 
strategies and political structures that have enabled the Iranian and Saudi regimes to remain in 
power.  In Iran, the clerical establishment of the Islamic Republic solidified its rule soon after the 
revolution with the concept of velayat-e faqeh enshrined in the constitution.  The war with Iraq 
provided the new government with an opportunity to bolster this Islamic identity and authority 
by linking Islam with the surge of Iranian nationalism.  Despite the enormous devastation caused 
during the war Iraq, the constitutionally granted authority sustained the regime through the 
duration of the war and subsequent attempts at fundamental democratic reforms in the latter part 
1990s and early 2000s.  To be sure, like the Pahlavi monarchy before it, the Islamic Republic has 
relied on repressive measures to enforce its power—and oil revenue has been central to this—
most recently during the post-election protests in 2009.  However effective repression may be, by 
itself it is insufficient in maintaining a regime’s position in power.  In Iran, the codified authority 
of the clergy, and both the religion and the revolutionary ideology of the regime, have been the 
regime’s primary sources of power rather than just its oil wealth.   
 In Saudi Arabia, the regime’s massive oil wealth facilitated its expansion and buttressed 
its power but other factors have played a significant role in enabling the monarchy to survive.  
As a dynastic monarchy, the royal family holds a firm grip on the entire government.  Its family 
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members are dispersed throughout the state bureaucracy ensuring that the monarchy safeguards 
its authority in the large number of different state institutions.  The family also controls the 
succession of rule, which not only decides who leads Saudi Arabia, but also prevents internal 
fracturing and the infiltration of those outside the family who have an interest in challenging the 
monarchy’s power.  In addition, the monarchy reemphasized its Islamic character as its main 
source of legitimacy in response the Islamic uprisings in Mecca and the Eastern Province in 
1979.  The monarchy has long relied upon its Wahabist Islamic identity to bolster its support 
among religious conservatives and the general population.  Morevover, the monarchy maintained 
and strengthened its relationship with the United States at various times.  American support was 
and remains a crucial reason why authoritarianism endures in Saudi Arabia. 
 In light of this entire discussion about the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle 
East, it is necessary now to revisit the discussions about the Arab Spring.  This is necessary 
because, at its core, this thesis is really about the prospects for democracy in the region.  It has 
shown why focusing on oil wealth is an insufficient and incomplete explanation for 
authoritarianism in the region, but where does the discussion about enduring authoritarianism in 
the Middle East go from this point forward?  Additionally, what do the Iranian and Saudi 
Arabian cases say about democracy?  What are the broader implications of this thesis about the 
prospects for democracy in the region?   
 As the previous two chapters indicate, the Arab Spring illustrates the importance of 
examining the internal as well as external contexts of authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes.  It is 
only through this approach that one can understand the deeper issues that account for the 
persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East.  It is too simple to assert that authoritarianism 
persists in Iran and Saudi Arabia because of oil.  Likewise, it is too simple to argue that the Arab 
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Spring did not reach both countries because of their oil wealth.  In Iran, the government’s 
political structures and its position at the helm of Shi’a Islam enabled it to survive presidential 
elections and prevent the Arab Spring from making any significant inroads in Iran.  In terms of 
Saudi Arabia, the Saudi-American partnership essentially blocked the Arab Spring protests in 
Bahrain from spreading into Saudi Arabia. 
 This study demonstrates that not only do many factors contribute to the persistence of 
authoritarianism, it also points to a larger observation about democracy and the emergence of 
democracy in general.  The complexity and the uncertainty of what the process of 
democratization entails confirms the inaccuracy of dismissing the lack of democracy in the 
Middle East as an anomaly from the rest of the world.  Successful democratic development, 
wherever it occurs and has occurred, such as in the United States and Europe, is a complicated, 
multi-dimensional and long-term process.  Although scholars and political scientists all agree 
that a political environment where the ruling government allows the people’s voices to be heard 
is an essential component of democratization, they continue to debate about exactly which 
factors such a process requires.234  However, simply because it is a difficult and often unclear 
process does not mean that democracy cannot emerge in the Middle East.  Thus it is erroneous to 
contend that the democratic deficit in the Middle East is an abnormality.   
 Although it remains to be seen whether fundamental democratic outcomes will come to 
fruition in the future, the Arab Spring movement is testament to this assertion.  The Arab Spring 
is indicative of the real, though very difficult, possibility that democracy can in fact emerge in 
the Middle East.  Democratization requires an environment in which the people are able to 
express their demands upon whoever is in charge.  The movement has provided people across the 
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region with an opportunity to do so.  As mentioned previously, the people of Egypt, Tunisia and 
Libya have forced their respective leaders to step down.  Now, all three countries have begun 
taking steps towards some form of democratic governance.  Moreover, if past examples are any 
indication, democracies throughout the world came into fruition after long periods of turmoil and 
uncertainty.  The United States experienced eight years of war before finally gaining its 
independence from Great Britain.  With all of these facts in mind, the current struggles for 
democratic reform in the Middle East are no different, in terms of length of time and difficulty, 
than those of established democracies.  Therefore, democracy is no less likely to emerge in the 
region than anywhere else in the world. 
 The Arab Spring also demonstrates, again, the importance of examining the specific 
contexts and conditions of authoritarian Middle Eastern countries.  Only through this approach 
will one understand what factors have contributed to unfavorable internal and external conditions 
that block fundamental democratic reform.  This thesis has followed the same approach.  In order 
to comprehend why authoritarianism endures in Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as in other 
countries in the Middle East, it is necessary to investigate each country closely, taking into 
account the historical, political, economic and cultural factors that all shape a country’s makeup.  
Once having done this, one will see that the absence, thus far, of democracies in the region is not 
reducible to a one-fits-all explanation, but rather due to interdependent and complicated sets of 
factors. 
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